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INTRODUCTION
International terror-violence of frightening dimensions threatens
world order and strains international relations. Modern terrorism,1 en-
dangering human lives and jeopardizing fundamental freedoms, is fre-
quently confused with "legitimate" means of self-determination and
liberation.' Terrorism is a means of ideological warfare, 3 in which inno-
cent citizens of warring and non-warring states suffer the conse-
quences.4 In the past, terrorists limited attacks to persons and locations
having a direct relationship to an enemy government-through employ-
ment, ownership, or occupation. 5 The modern trend in terrorism is to
1. Calvert, Terrorism in the Theory of Revolution, in TERRORISM, IDEOLOGY &
REVOLUTION 27 (N. O'Sullivan ed. 1986) [hereinafter Calvert]. Modern terrorism is
similar to the revolutionary activity occurring during the French Revolution of 1789.
Revolutionaries used physical violence to create a basis for a new social order, execut-
ing members of the aristocracy for no reason other than their social status. Id. at 28.
2. Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 906 (1986) [hereinafter
Sofaer, Terrorism and Law]. United Nations resolutions do not establish a basis for
differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate struggles. Id. As a result most
groups apprehended while employing terrorist tactics justify their actions as legitimate
fights against oppression and avail themselves of the political offense exceptions to ex-
tradition; see infra notes 229-53 and accompanying text (discussing the political offense
exception to extradition and its abuse by terrorists).
3. See Alexander, Conference Report-Terrorism: The Threat and Possible Coun-
termeasures, 8 TERRORISM: AN INT'L J. 272 (1986). Terrorists primarily use violent
tactics to achieve ideological, political, and economic goals. Id. at 273; see also N.
LIVINGSTONE & T. ARNOLD, FIGHTING BACK 23 (1985) [hereinafter FIGHTING BACK]
(concluding that terrorism is an actual form of warfare and that Western nations must
acknowledge an undeclared war between terrorism-sponsoring nations and the West to
justify a defensive war against terrorism).
4. Lynch, International Terrorism: The Search for a Policy, 9 TERRORISM: AN
INT'L J. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Lynch]. Because of the inaccessibility of the true targets
of terrorists, they attack the more accessible innocent civilians. Id. at 9-10.
5. See Bell, Comment: The Origins of Modern Terrorism, 9 TERRORISM: AN INT'L
J. 307-08 (1987) (noting that in the past, the victims of terrorist attacks were targeted
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attack innocent civilians sharing the nationality of the enemy govern-
ment6 and to hold that government hostage in the eyes of the public.7
The international community has not effectively deterred acts of in-
ternational terrorism." Despite numerous declarations denouncing ter-
rorist activity, practical and effective sanctions are elusive. In an effort
to reinforce the international battle against terrorism, the United Na-
tions unequivocally condemned terrorist activity, particularly the killing
of innocent hostages.10 Nations' inability to combat this international
threat is partially due to the nature of terrorist warfare.'1 Character-
ized by surprise attacks, violent strikes against innocent citizens, 12 and
the unpredictable bombing of airports, airplanes, and embassies, the
perpetrators of terror-violence are difficult to apprehend." Even when a
because of their influence on events and regimes). Modern terrorism is not directed at
individuals with influence, but at individuals with certain characteristics such as reli-
gion and nationality. Populations are the targets, not individuals. Id. at 309.
6. Id. But cf. Wilkinson, Fighting the Hydra: International Terrorism and the
Rule of Law, in Calvert, supra note 1, at 205 (noting that United States citizens have
always been major targets of terrorists).
7. Burtchael, Moral Response to Terrorism, in FIGHTING BACK, supra note 3, at
191, 194.
8. See A. MILLER, TERRORISM AND HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION 8 (1980) [hereinafter
A. MILLER] (discussing ineffective attempts by the United Nations to combat interna-
tional terrorism). The author criticizes the United Nations for its inability to afford
innocent civilians the same protection as diplomats. Id. at 9.
9. Lynch, supra note 4, at 64-69 (describing the "murkiness" of international law
on issues of terrorism).
10. See Measures to Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers or Takes
Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms and the Study of Under-
lying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence Which Lie in Misery,
Frustration, Grievance and Despair and Which Cause Some People to Sacrifice
Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, G.A.
Res. 40/61, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) (108th mtg.), U.N. Doec. A/40/53
(1985), reprinted in Press Release GA/7272 (Jan. 13, 1986) (calling for international
cooperation to eliminate acts of international terrorism and their underlying causes);
see also L. HIPPCHEN & Y. YIM, TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND ARMS CON-
TROL 71 (providing an analysis of the nature and background of international
terrorism).
11. See M. CRENSHAW, TERRORISM, LEGITIMACY, AND POWER: THE CONSE-
QUENCES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 143 (1982) (noting that, in the confusion surround-
ing terrorist attacks, the criminal nature is subdued and the activity is interpreted as "a
mode of doing politics"). The nature of terrorist warfare is so complex that establishing
a consistent and comprehensive policy is very difficult. Id.
12. See Netanyahu, Terrorism: How the West Can Win, TIME, Apr. 14, 1986, at
48 (discussing certain characteristics and tactics of terrorists, such as attacking the
weak and defenseless and deliberately violating laws of war); see also A. SCHMID, PO-
LITICAL TERRORISM: A RESEARCH GUIDE TO CONCEPTS, THEORIES, DATA BASES, AND
LITERATURE 79-83 (1982) [hereinafter A. SCHMID] (describing the difference between
innocent victims of terrorism, civilian victims of terrorism, noncombatant victims of
terrorism, and symbolic victims of terrorism).
13. Lutz, Streiker & Johnson-Champ, International Terrorism: A Legal Bibliogra-
phy of Selected Issues and Sources, 20 INT'L LAW. 1083 (1986) (stating that, for a
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state captures terrorists, national laws against international terrorism
generally fail to provide sanctions that satisfy the offended states' au-
thorities.14 Thus, modern terrorism 15 menaces states that are reluctant
and unsuccessful in their efforts to combat the increasing threat."
Part I of this Comment discusses the response of the United States
and the international community to the recent surge in terror-violence,
specifically examining hostage-taking as an effective terror-tactic. This
Comment then considers the international community's inability to
agree on the definition of terrorism, making legal sanctions ineffective.
Part II provides a prospective of the terrorism crisis, highlighting the
underlying agitators further complicating measures to combat terror-
ism-such as state-sponsored terrorism, the nature of terrorist warfare,
media coverage of terrorist attacks, and the difficulty of extraditing ter-
rorists. Part III addresses the response of the United States to interna-
tional terrorism through an examination of domestic and international
legal measures and changes in United States foreign policy. Part IV
analyzes the possible jurisdictional responses to the problem of prose-
cuting terrorists who abduct and murder United States citizens and of-
fers a conclusion on the most effective jurisdictional approach. Part V
discusses the international measures on terrorism, specifically on hos-
tage-taking, and suggests an international jurisdictional approach after
an analysis of United Nation's initiatives to solve the terrorism prob-
lem. This Comment concludes that the United States and the interna-
tional community should pursue a legal response to the international
terrorist threat, giving states broader jurisdictional license to prosecute
and extradite terrorists.
variety of reasons, most terrorists are beyond the reach of states' laws); see J. MUR-
PHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 107 (1985) (noting that the apprehension
and prosecution of terrorists is a rare phenomena).
14. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, Part IV, Introductory Note, at 179 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT DRAFT]. The Restatement Draft acknowledges the limitations on the
authority of states to apply laws extraterritorially when the action conflicts with other
states' interests. Section 401 of the Restatement Draft describes the limitations on state
authority to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce. Id.
15. See Kupperman, Terrorism and National Security, in Conference Re-
port-State-Sponsored Terrorism: The Threat and Possible Countermeasures, re-
printed in 8 TERRORISM: AN INT'L J. 255, 257 (1986) [hereinafter Conference Report]
(discussing the new breed of modern terrorism characterized by groups that hide be-
hind the protective veil of states illicitly sponsoring the terrorist activity).
16. Id. at 255.
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I. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A GLOBAL CONCERN
A. HOSTAGE-TAKING: A TERROR TAcTIC
Hostage-taking became a popular terrorist tactic during the late
1960s because of its destabilizing force.17 Although the taking and kill-
ing of hostages is a recognized component of armed conflict,", the re-
cent increase in terrorist hostage-taking, calling attention to political
causes, securing the release of criminals, and humiliating governments,
has inspired the United States to strengthen its commitment to fight
international terrorism.'9
17. Cooper, Hostage Rights: Law and Practice in Throes of Evolution, 15 CASE
W. REs. J. INT'L L. 61, 61 n.3 (1983) [hereinafter Cooper]. Before 1972, aircraft hi-
jacking was the primary provocation of international response. Id. at 79. Taking inno-
cent citizens hostage as a means of intimidating and coercing states reached unprece-
dented notoriety during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. Id. at 80. The
availability of mass communications increases the effectiveness of this method of ter-
rorism, allowing terrorists to capture the attention of the world community. Wurth-
Hough, Network News Coverage of Terrorism: The Early Years, 6 TERRORS:: AN
INT'L J. 403, 404 (1983) [hereinafter Wurth-Houghl. The more offensive the crime,
the more media coverage it attracts. See generally VIOLENCE AS COMMUNICATION 9
(A. Schmid & J. de Graaf eds. 1982) [hereinafter A. Schmid & J. de Graaf] (discuss-
ing the different ways terrorists manipulate news media).
18. Cooper, supra note 17, at 62 (1983). Historically, hostage-taking is recognized
under the law of war as a disagreeable, but inevitable characteristic of armed conflict.
Id. States allied with the alleged offenders claim terrorist attacks are a means of legiti-
mate struggle and thus individuals and groups engaged in violent actions possess
soldiers' privileges to kill and receive prisoner of war treatment. International Law As-
sociation Committee on International Terrorism, International Terrorism: Fourth In-
terim Report of the Committee, reprinted in 7 TERRORISM: AN INT'L J. 123 (1984)
[hereinafter Fourth Report].
19. Note, The Taking and Killing of Hostages: Coercion and Reprisal in Interna-
tional Law, 54 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 131, 131 (1978). The practice of taking hostages
is ancient. See Alexander, The Terrorism Problem, in Conference Report, supra note
15, at 272 (presenting a historical perspective of terrorism). The international attitude
toward hostage-taking and killing is evolving and increasingly categorizing the crime as
barbaric. The attitude of Congress condemning terrorism is evident in legislation pro-
posed in 1985. See Bills to Authorize Prosecution of Terrorists and Others Who At-
tack U.S. Government Employees and Citizens Abroad: Hearings on S. 1373. S. 1429
and S. 1508, Before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1985) [hereinafter Prosecution Bills] (pro-
posing legislation to prosecute those who attack United States citizens and personnel
abroad). S. 1508 requires a determination of whether the imposition of the death pen-
alty is justified. Considerations include: 1) mitigating factors such as age, mental ca-
pacity (although this is not a defense), duress, level of participation, and 2) aggravating
factors such as previous convictions and mens rea. Id; see also S. 1508, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 88 (1985) (introducing S. 1508 with the intent to "close the
statutory gap by amending the existing hostage-taking statute to permit application of
the death penalty . . . for first degree murder"). Senator Specter justifies the "abduc-
tion" of terrorists for the purpose of prosecution in the United States by analogizing
the situation to Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). In Ker, the defendant was kid-
napped in Peru by Illinois authorities and later tried and convicted in the United
States. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 438 (1886). The Supreme Court upheld his con-
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The increase in terrorist incidents has prompted states in the interna-
tional community to study subversive activities and seek international
cooperation to stop terror-violence and hostage-taking.20 No interna-
tional consensus exists, however, regarding the best means of achieving
the desired results-the freedom of hostages in captivity, the punish-
ment of hostage-takers, and the prevention of future hostage-taking.21
B. DEFINITIONAL DILEMMA: TERRORISTS V. FREEDOM FIGHTERS
Defining terrorism in an internationally recognized form causes con-
troversy among states with divergent interests.22 Parties with different
viction, disclaiming any constitutional ground for objecting to this mode of arrest or
trial. Id. at 444. With the Ker case as support, Senator Specter called for "arrest with
reasonable force in whatever way is doable." Such action would authorize extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction in an incident involving a United States citizen even if jurisdiction can
only be based upon nationality of the victim. Prosecution Bills, supra note 19, at 44.
Although Senator Specter does not use the phrase "passive personality principle," he is
effectively suggesting its application if no other means of jurisdiction will allow prose-
cution. Id.; see also Sofaer, Terrorism and Law, supra note 2, at 919 (noting that the
international community has only accepted the use of extraterritorial force in very lim-
ited circumstances and that the United States has historically rejected the passive per-
sonality principle). The author indicates, however, that the strict adherence to this
principle "would serve to insulate the perpetrators of international violence from any
control or punishment for their crimes." Id.
20. 40 U.N. SCOR (2637th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/579 (1985) (calling for
increased international cooperation to devise effective measures to prosecute and punish
all acts of hostage-taking as manifestations of international terrorism).
21. See Conference Report: Terrorism, Future Threats and Responses, 7 TERROR-
IsM: AN INT'L J. 367, 372 (1985) (commenting on the lack of any consensus on the
lawlessness of international crimes, i.e., terrorism).
22. International Terrorism, Insurgency, and Drug Trafficking Present Trends in
Terrorist Activity: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Relations and the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 183 (1985). In the Senate hearings,
testimony suggested that the barrier to effective legal controls is "the definitional and
moral confusion over what constitutes terrorism." Id. The definition offered at the hear-
ings proclaimed terrorism as:
The deliberate employment of violence or threat of use of violence by sovereign
states or sub-national groups encouraged or assisted by sovereign states to attain
strategic and political objectives by acts in violation of law intended to create
overwhelming fear in a target population larger than the civilian or military vic-
tims attacked or threatened.
Id. at 183-84. See Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, Analytical Study
Prepared by the Secretariat in Accordance with G.A. Res. 32/147, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.160/4 (1979) (discussing the need for an international definition of terrorism, the
difficulty of reaching an international consensus, and providing a variety of govern-
ments' perspectives on the terrorism issue). The confusion about the definition of ter-
rorism is evidenced by the multitude of definitions and the lack of consensus on the
components of the acts. See A. SCHMID, supra note 12, at 119-58 (providing a collec-
tion of eighty-nine definitions of terrorism by various authors and authorities). Schmid
cites the definition adopted by the United States government as "the threat or use of
violence for political purposes when such action is intended to influence the attitude or
behavior of a target group wider than its immediate victims and its ramifications tran-
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motives manipulate the confusion surrounding terrorism and self-deter-
mination to legitimize their actions.23 What one state considers terror-
ism, another state may consider a valid exercise of resistance.24 This
difference in interpretation prevents the development of effective legal
principles to deter terrorism.25
The statement that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom-
fighter"2 illustrates the definitional dilemma. Allowing certain parties
scend national boundaries." Id. at 147.
Other proposed definitions of terrorism by international scholars include:
Terrorism means any international use of violence or a threat of violence by the
accused against an instrumental target in order to communicate to a primary
target a threat of future violence so as to coerce the primary target through
intense fear or anxiety in connection with a demanded political outcome.
Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity
for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doc-
trine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 251 (Annex B) (1983) [hereinafter Paust]; see also
Friedlander, Terrorism and Self-Determination: The Fatal Nexus, 7 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & Com. 263, 265 (1979-80) (defining terrorism as "the use of force, or threat
of force, directed against innocent third parties for primarily ideological, financial or
psychological purposes"). The failure of the international community to agree on an
acceptable definition of international terrorism has been one of the major obstacles in
adopting effective international sanctions and agreements. Id.
23. See McWhinney, International Terrorism: United Nations Projects for Legal
Controls, 7 TERRORISM: AN INT'L J. 175, 181-82 (1984) (discussing the subjectivity of
definitions of terrorism).
24. 1 R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL
CONTROL 125-31 (1979) [hereinafter I R. FRIEDLANDER]. See generally NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1976) (providing a bibliography of works written on differ-
ent aspects of terrorist warfare); A. LAKOS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A BIBLIOG-
RAPHY (1986) (providing a comprehensive bibliography of works on terrorism).
25. See Almond, Using Law to Combat Terrorism, in FIGHTING BACK, supra note
3, at 157, 160 (discussing the many faces of terrorism and the effect of the uncertainty
about the definition upon the development of effective legal principles); Ad Hoe Com-
mittee on International Terrorism, Analytical Study Prepared by the Secretariat in
Accordance with G.A. Res. 32/147, 1979 U.N.Y.B. 1146, 1147-49, U.N. Doe. A/
AC.160/4 (discussing the need for an international definition of terrorism and the diffi-
culty of reaching a consensus on the elements of terrorist warfare). The study provides
the perspectives of various nations on the definitional dilemma. Id.; see also Shultz,
Terrorism" The Challenge to the Democracies, 34 DEP'T ST. BULL 2 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Schultz] (finding a unifying thread in terrorism-'the attempt to impose their will
by force . . designed to create an atmosphere of fear").
26. But cf. Begin, Freedom Fighters and Terrorists, in INTERNATIONAL TERROR-
ISM: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE 39-46 (B. Netanyahu ed. 1979) [hereinafter B.
Netanyahu] (suggesting that the difference between terrorists and freedom fighters is
that terrorists kill innocent civilians, while freedom fighters save lives and fight at the
risk of their own lives "until liberty wins the day"); A. MILLER, supra note 8, at 8-9
(criticizing the United Nation's inability to distinguish between freedom fighters and
terrorists for the purpose of protecting innocent civilians when the United Nations has
made this distinction for the protection of diplomats); Elkins, Caging the Beasts, in B.
Netanyahu, supra, at 230-31 (opining that terrorists are defined by what they do, not
by their political purposes).
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to commit acts of violence under the guise of "freedom fighter" makes
sanctioning the same activity committed by other parties nearly impos-
sible. Countries cannot implement laws effectively when the process in-
volves a determination of the legitimacy of each actor.2 7 The defini-
tional dilemma is the result of inconsistent interpretations of terrorist
attacks made by the international legal community on terrorist issues
as a whole.28 If the international community can focus on the acts com-
mitted and not the various groups claiming the right to commit the
acts, then the community can adopt a definition that distinguishes
permissable and impermissible activity.2 Such definitions would enable
the international community to provide legal sanctions for acts, regard-
less of the identity of actors.30
The evolution of terrorist tactics such as hostage-taking and ruthless
murder of innocent civilians demands a distinction between legitimate
and illegitimate means of insurgency. United States government offi-
cials make that distinction, charging that those who kill or abduct inno-
cent civilians are not freedom-fighters under any circumstances-they
are terrorists."' Although the United States position on terrorism is
27. R. FRIEDLANDER, TERROR-VIOLENCE: ASPECTS OF SOCIAL CONTROL 48 (1983)
[hereinafter R. FRIEDLANDER, TERROR-VIOLENCE] (stating that although distinguish-
ing between legitimate and illegitimate is as difficult as separating rebellion from con-
flict-violence can not be legitimate against innocent parties).
28. Conference Report, supra note 15, at 275 (noting that some states find terror-
ism justified when the actors fight for a valid cause, such as the right to self-determina-
tion or resistance to a totalitarian regime).
29. See R. FRIEDLANDER, TERROR-VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 198 (encouraging
the prosecution of terrorists regardless of motive and claiming that terrorism is imper-
missible in a law-ordered society).
30. See International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/
146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), reprinted in
18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979) [hereinafter Hostage Convention] (signed by the United States
on January 6, 1985) (defining the act of hostage-taking in article 1 with no mention of
the actor's motivation). Although it is easy to label incidents as terrorist attacks, and in
many instances easy for the West to label the perpetrators as terrorists, there is no
consensus on this classification. When countries identify with the particular group's
struggle-for example countries in the Middle East and the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization (PLO)-they classify the terrorist attacks as legitimate means to achieve
the legitimate goal of reestablishing the holy land. See generally The Availability of
Civil and Criminal Actions Against Yassir Arrafat's Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion [PLO]: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (statement of Mary V. Mochary,
Deputy Legal Advisor, United States Department of State) (stating that few terrorists
are ever apprehended after the incident and asking for the enactment of more laws to
combat the terrorist threat). Mochary advocates the abolition of the political offense
exception, finding that the exception has "no place" in extradition treaties between
stable democracies that have political systems to redress legitimate grievances and judi-
cial process to provide fair treatment. Id. at 88.
31. See Schultz, supra note 25, at 2 (quoting Senator Henry Jackson as saying that
the idea that one man's terrorist is another's freedom-fighter cannot be sanctioned and
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clear, effective measures to combat the problem are difficult to imple-
ment.32 Most attacks against its citizens occur abroad, leaving the
United States unable to either prosecute or ensure prosecution due to
the number of states sympathetic to the plight of the freedom fighter
and consequently offering the fugitives sanctuary. Without the assis-
tance of the international community in reaching a consensus on the
definition of international terrorism, United States efforts to deter ter-
rorism with legal sanctions are futile.
Defining impermissible acts by terrorists is difficult because terrorist
attacks share many components of acts of war.33 Therefore, groups
claiming they are at war with imperialist governments justify their at-
tacks as acts of war.34 Because most terrorist groups are not directly
associated with a government,35 the war-like activity does not fall
within the international legal grasp. Terrorist are consequently allowed
to continue attacking and killing innocent civilians without much
consequence."
An additional factor complicating the problem of defining terrorism
is the subsequent identification of the actual terrorists. Many small,
splintered terrorist organizations are supported by governments sympa-
thetic to their causes, because of similar ideologies and common ene-
that associating the word "freedom" with terror-violence would be a disgrace to demo-
cratic societies). A simple distinction between terrorism and self-determination is that
"legally speaking, terrorism focuses upon the effect, while self-determination deals with
causal relationships ... terrorism is a human wrong, self-determination is, arguably, a
human right." Friedlander, Terrorism and Self-Determination: The Fatal Nexus, 7
SYRACUSE J. INTL L. & COi. 263, 266 (1979-80).
32. Alexander, The Terrorism Problem, in Conference Report, supra note 15, at
273. Although United States foreign policy on terrorism is clear, the United States
failure to specifically define terrorism and accompanying criminal acts has contributed
to the confusion over what acts constitute terrorism. Id.
33. See W. FARRELL, U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO TERRORISMt: IN SEARCH OF
AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY 6 (1982) [hereinafter W. FARRELL] (noting that terrorism is
not easily separable from wars, disasters, and accidents). Farrell provides a lengthy list
of definitions and analyzes the problems with applying them to international terrorism.
Id. at 7-13.
34. See McGinley, The Achille Lauro Affair-Implications for International Law,
52 TENN. L. REv. 691, 702 (1984-85) [hereinafter McGinley] (stating that customary
international law recognizes certain circumstances during armed conflicts when hos-
tage-taking is permissible).
35. Conference Report, supra note 15, at 257-58 (discussing the new breed of ter-
rorism characterized by nation-states that use proxies that are easily disowned).
36. But see Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Inter-
national Law, 80 AM. J. INTL L. 612, 632 (1986) [hereinafter Leich] (discussing the
United States strike against Libya after a clear link between the terrorist activity and
the Libyan government was established). Once a sufficient relationship between the
terrorists and a government is established, the country of the attacked party may in-
voke self-defense measures under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. U.N.
CHARTER art. 51.
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mies. 37 Identifying the faction of the terrorist organization committing
the immediate acts is, therefore, useless in preventing the continuation
of similar attacks when the sponsoring state escapes undetected.3 8 In an
effort to stop the increasing number of attacks, the United States is
identifying governments supporting the terrorists.39 When the United
States discovers a positive link between a government and a terrorist
act, it has shown a willingness to fight back. 40 This low-level form of
warfare is the result of United States frustration with ineffective means
of prosecuting and deterring terrorists who kill United States citizens
abroad.41
II. UNDERLYING AGITATORS
A. STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM
The United States reaction is also an indication of the government's
unwillingness to tolerate state-sponsored terrorism by hostile govern-
ments. The most dramatic problem of modern terrorism is the increase
in international state-sponsored terrorism.42 A characteristic of this in-
crease is the focus on attacking innocent civilians and non-toletarian
societies.43 Two basic problems arise in attempting to stop state-spon-
sored terrorism. First, the breakdown, or lack of a nation-state claiming
responsibility for the terrorist activity leaves victims unable to bring
formal actions through the United Nations legal channels. Second, the
sponsoring state rarely acknowledges covert support for guerilla opera-
37. Livingstone & Arnold, The Rise of State-Sponsored Terrorism, in FIGHTING
BACK, supra note 3, at 12-13 [hereinafter Livingstone & Arnold] (discussing the grow-
ing cooperation between fraternal revolutionary organizations and Soviet and Mideas-
tern countries).
38. N. LIVINGSTONE, THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM 163 (1983) [hereinafter N.
LIVINGSTONE] (explaining that even when states identify and apprehend terrorists, they
often release the terrorists because of fear of further violence and blackmail).
39. See infra note 45 and accompanying text (listing governments that the United
States has identified as supporting terrorist activity).
40. Leich, supra note 36, at 632. The United States invoked the right of self-de-
fense under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In a statement to the Security
Council, a United States representative explained the scope of the attack on Libya andjustified the attack as a response to Libya's violation of article 2(4) of the United Na-
tions Charter. Id. The specific violation was Libya's policy of threats and use of force
against the United States and its citizens. Id. at 633.
41. See Kupperman, Terrorism and National Security, in Conference Report,
supra note 15, at 255, 257 (noting that terrorist organizations are often indirectly or
secretly related to sympathetic governments that provide safe havens from prose-
cution).
42. Livingstone & Arnold, supra note 37, at 11-12.
43. The President Proposes Legislation to Counter Terrorism, 84 DEP'T ST. BULL.
65 (June 1984).
[VOL. 2:153
HOSTAGE-TAKING
tions promoting that state's interests and ideologies."4
The United States has isolated five countries that, over the past five
years, have increasingly supported terrorist activity.'0 According to the
United States Department of State, incidents of terrorism increased
thirty percent in 1984, with a high percentage of that increase occur-
ring in the Middle East."6 The response of the United States to sus-
pected state-sponsored terrorism includes imposing various sanctions
and, in some cases, severing diplomatic relations.4'
The United States is implementing preventative measures against the
rise of state-sponsored terrorism.48 These measures include using intel-
ligence sources to intercept or detect terrorist activity before the acts
occur, as well as the employment of active defense sources to make the
acts more costly to terrorists.'9 Some states, the United Kingdom for
example, have filed declarations against state-sponsored terrorism. 0
Other states, plagued with an increasing number of terrorist attacks
instigated by covert actions of governments, will inevitably follow suit.
The detection and elimination of individual acts through the employ-
ment of intelligence forces may act as the most effective sanction in the
fight against state-sponsored terrorism.51 This approach avoids actual
confrontation with the supporting government when the link between
the sponsoring government and the terrorists is not positively estab-
lished. In instances in which the connecting link is clearly established,
the United States will not rule out measures available through the
United Nations doctrines of self-defense.52
44. Livingstone & Arnold, supra note 37, at 11, 14 (explaining that by the mid-
seventies terrorism was highly cooperative, but that patron states preferred to stay in
the background and control indirectly).
45. Oakley, Terrorism" Overview and Developments, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 61 (Nov.
1985) (listing Cuba, Libya, Nicaragua, Iran, and Syria as the states sponsoring terror-
ism); see also Reagan, The New Network of Terrorist States, 9 TERRORS.t: AN IN'L
J. 101-09 (1987) (adding North Korea to the list of states that sponsor terrorism and
discussing the close Soviet relationship with the terrorist network).
46. Oakley, Combating International Terrorism, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 73-78 (June
1985) [hereinafter Oakley].
47. Id. Such sanctions rarely solve the problem and, in the case of severing diplo-
matic relations, may prolong the conflict. Id.; see also Leich, supra note 36, at 629(imposing economic sanctions on Libya for material support to terrorist groups).
48. See W. FARRELL, supra note 33, 32-46 (discussing the different departments in
the United States government and their roles in combatting the international terrorist
threat).
49. Oakley, supra note 46, at 73-78.
50. Sayre, International Terrorism: A Long Twilight Struggle, 84 DEP'T ST. BULL.
48 (Oct. 1984).
51. Oakley, supra note 46, at 73-78.
52. Livingstone, Proactive Responses to Terrorism: Reprisals, Preemption. and
Retribution, in FIGHTING BACK, supra note 3, at 109, 119. The possible responses to
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B. THE NATURE OF TERRORIST WARFARE:
INVISIBLE BLOCKADES
The nature of terror-violence makes the activity difficult to control in
the international community. Terrorist attacks are predominantly vio-
lent, characterized by suicide missions, car bombs, and aircraft hijack-
ings. The insurgents risk their lives to advance "the cause"--whether
political, religious, or fanatical-and are later immortalized as martyrs
and heroes.5 Laws prohibiting terrorist activity are ineffective because
terrorists commit the acts considering goals, not sanctions." This moti-
vation for the attacks frustrates the traditional philosophy underlying
the imposition of criminal sanctions-the deterrence of undesirable acts
through the imposition of punishment.
Terrorists do not account for their actions to international courts or
authorities. 5 Injured parties are, therefore, helpless in their quest for
redress unless states who have custody of terrorists are willing to extra-
dite or prosecute the terrorists. Because of the violent reprisals by ter-
rorist organizations, most states do not dare sanction the members of
terrorist organizations.5" The conflicting interests of states, resulting in
the refusal of many states to prosecute or extradite terrorists, under-
mine international efforts to stop modern terror-violence.5 7 The impo-
tence of individual states in the fight against international terror has
prompted the United Nations to seek effective measures to curb the
increasing number of terrorist attacks. By enacting an international
convention with a broad jurisdictional base,58 the United Nations hopes
to stop the current increase in terrorist activity. A contributing factor
in the increase of terrorist attacks is the publicity and attention that
the attacks receive in the international community. Scholars have stud-
terrorism that can be justified under article 51 of the United Nations Charter are re-
prisal, preemption, and retribution. On April 15, 1986, the United States exercised the
inherent right to self-defense under article 51 when it struck terrorist-related targets in
Libya after discovering the positive link between the Libyan government and terrorists
attacking United States citizens abroad. Leich, supra note 36, at 632-33.
53. Lynch, supra note 4, at 13 (discussing the difficulty of deterring attacks when
the actor does not consider the legal sanctions for the crimes).
54. Id. at 13-14.
55. See id. at 64 (noting that terrorism escapes coverage under strategic, interna-
tional, and domestic legal structures).
56. See supra note 38 (discussing states' hesitancy to sanction terrorists because of
fear of reprisal).
57. See infra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing the Egyptian govern-
ments refusal to prosecute the terrorists after the Achille Lauro incident because prose-
cution of members of the PLO would be against Egypt's national interest).
58. See Hostage Convention, supra note 30, at art. 5 (granting jurisdiction on the
basis of the victim's nationality).
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ied the role of the media in reporting terrorist incidents, recognizing
the correlation between publicity and terrorist goals. With the increase
in violent terrorist attacks, the relationship between the media and ter-
rorism has become increasingly important.
C. TELEVISION: THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN THE GROWTH OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
The increase in the impact of terror-violence on governments and
private parties is intricately related to the growth of the communication
industry that transmits the terrorist threats.5" The extensive coverage
of the most inhumane acts creates a sympathetic atmosphere for ter-
rorists, forcing states to control the lives of innocents by either meeting
demands or causing the deaths of innocents as a consequence. 0
Through this manipulation of crisis, terrorists achieve fear and confu-
sion in viewers, disguising their means of obtaining publicity as legiti-
mate means of struggle." As a result, terrorist attacks, endangering
human lives and jeopardizing fundamental freedoms, are frequently
confused with "legitimate" means of self-determination and liber-
ation.62
The media faces the same problems plaguing the international com-
munity in reaching a consensus on an accurate definition of terrorism.
As a primary source of public opinion, the media's presentation of ter-
rorist activity is crucial to the education of its audience. 3 The media
tends to distort reality and exaggerate the capabilities of terrorists in
the extensive coverage of violent attacks.6 Terrorists depend on this
access to the media for conveying their ideological messages to the in-
ternational public.65 In the many dramatic and tragic incidents, the ter-
59. Wurth-Hough, supra note 17, at 404. Wurth-Hough presents a study on the
reporting of terrorist incidents by the three major United States networks. The study
discusses how technology facilitates the spreading of terrorism and attempts to distin-
guish between terrorist and mere criminal acts. Id. at 405.
60. See B. Netanyahu, supra note 26, at 250-52 (discussing terrorists' ability to
psychologically manipulate the public through the media).
61. See N. LIVINGSTONE, supra note 38, at 57 (noting that the strategy of ter-
rorists is to communicate fear and to achieve political goals through the threat of
violence).
62. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing problems in distinguishing
legitimate and illegitimate activity by revolutionaries).
63. See Wurth-Hough, supra note 17, at 405 (discussing a study of the impact of
terrorism as portrayed by the three major networks).
64. Id. at 418; see also Decter, The Need for Clarity, in B. Nctanyahu, supra note
26, at 243-44 (discussing the inability of the media to distinguish questionable and
horrific acts-resulting in inconsistent and confusing portrayals of terrorist incidents).
65. See N. LIVINGSTONE, supra note 38, at 57 (quoting opinions that support con-
tentions that terrorists depend heavily on the media).
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rorists capture more than just innocent citizens and public attention,
they practically hijack the media itself.66 Such criticism of the media
does not emanate from the stories that are reported, but from the
method of reporting. 7 The rewards to journalists often appear to out-
weigh the concerns for the lives of the victims.
1. First Amendment Balance
The media argues its right to report terrorist incidents is based on
the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press.6 8 Additionally,
the media asserts that the first amendment grants the right to gather
news on the situs of the activity. 9 Although first amendment freedom
is clearly stated in the United States Constitution, ° United States
courts have designated areas and times when it is permissable to
abridge or suppress this freedom. 71 Two examples of these restrictions
are the prohibitions on obscenity and restrictions on the media when
"clear and present danger" is imminent. When "specific harm of a
grave nature would surely result from media dissemination of certain
information," the United States may restrict first amendment free-
doms.7 3 If the media fails to adopt responsible guidelines on reporting
terrorist incidents, the government may regulate the media's access to
news and information.74
Regulation of media access to crisis terrorist situations is justifiable
66. A. MILLER, supra note 8, at 85. See also N. LIVINGSTONE, supra note 38, at
65 (noting that the media is often symbolically held hostage by terrorists requiring the
media to participate in the hostage negotiations).
67. A. MILLER, supra note 8, at 86.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no laws ... abridg-
ing freedom of speech, or of the press"). But cf. N. LIVINGSTONE, supra note 38, at 73
(noting that most news organizations have adopted voluntary guidelines regardless of
any infringement on first amendment rights).
69. Miller, Terrorism and the Media: Observations from the American and British
Experiences, in MANAGING TERRORISM: STRATEGIES FOR THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE
91, 93 (P. Montana & G. Roukis eds. 1983) [hereinafter P. Montana & G. Roukis].
70. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing freedom of speech ac-
cording to the United States Constitution).
71. See Livingstone, Terrorism and the Media Revolution, in FIGHTING BACK,
supra note 3, at 222 (quoting Justice Holmes on the limitations of free speech when
words are used that "create a clear and present danger that they will bring about ...
substantive evils").
72. Id. at 222. The clear and present danger test is the guide for determining when
free speech may be abridged. Id.
73. Id. at 221. In the past, there was speculation that the government would impose
regulations and guidelines on the media. Id. This fear was the result of severe criticism
of the media after the 1977 Hanafi Muslim hostage incident in Washington, D.C. Id.
74. See id. (discussing certain situations that would justify imposition of prior re-
straint by the government).
[VOL. 2:153
HOSTAGE-TAKING
when the media's actions may endanger the lives of hostages. Numer-
ous incidents have been reported where the media's release of informa-
tion endangered the lives of hostages or jeopardized negotiation at-
tempts.7 5 In many of these incidents, the media's concern for getting
the story,78 not for the lives endangered, has earned severe criticism
from both law enforcement officials and the general public.
By refusing to adopt comprehensive policy guidelines on airing ter-
rorist incidents and videotapes produced by terrorists, the media is
manipulated and utilized for terrorist purposes. Terrorists see television
as the most effective access to the press that is otherwise controlled by
the economically wealthy and powerful." From this perspective, the
real problem causing terrorist attacks is a malfunction in the Western
information order. 8 Without access to communication, it is inevitable
that the less powerful will use whatever methods available to access the
largest audience possible.79 Even accepting the imbalance in access to
the media, the terrorist method of killing innocent civilians to publicize
their causes is not tolerable in an international community seeking
world peace and order.
2. Law Enforcement and Media
During terrorist attacks, the inapposite goals of law enforcement and
the media produce tension.s0 Law enforcement's concerns are with the
safety of victims and journalist's concerns are with getting "the
story."8" At times, the media interferes with police operations, jeopard-
izing the lives of hostages.82 Instead of working against each other, law
enforcement and media should work together to end the crisis. 83
75. P. Montana & G. Roukis, supra note 69, at 92. The goals of the me-
dia-gathering the news as it occurs-often interferes with police operations during a
terrorist seige. These goals are not easily reconciled when the lives of innocent victims
are at stake. Id. at 91-92.
76. Id. at 97, 98.
77. See A. Schmid & J. de Graaf, supra note 17, at 180 (explaining that groups
lacking access to the media use terror-violence to gain publicity and recognitition).
78. Id. at 193-200.
79. Id. at 218. Democratization of the press, which is a technical impossibility,
would remedy this situation. Id. at 222. To avoid the seizure of media power, the media
could adopt new reporting values and focus on stories having social utility, while realis-
tically portraying the proportionate influences of the events. Id. This would help pre-
vent the use of violence and murder as a justification for access to the press. Id.
80. P. Montana & G. Roukis, supra note 69, at 91.
81. Id. at 97.
82. See id. at 95 (describing a number of incidents when the media's broadcasting
of police action or position caused the failure of a law enforcement maneuver in process
or the death of a hostage).
83. See id. at 93 (urging civil authorities to work with the media rather than inter-
1987]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
D. EXTRADITION: THE KEY TO PROSECUTION
Another serious concern of law enforcement is the inability to obtain
custody of terrorists through extradition treaties. Without effective ex-
tradition agreements, hostage-taking and aircraft hijacking will con-
tinue to plague the international community. In absence of bilateral
treaty provisions, states are not obligated to extradite persons accused
of violent terrorist activity. If bilateral extradition treaties exist, states
using the treaties to obtain custody of terrorists experience the same
defintional problem as the international community. The problem is
further complicated by the lack of consensus on the definition of terror-
ism and the legitimacy of certain methods to achieve the goals of self-
determination, insurgency, and terrorism.
Many states regard violent acts committed by insurgents in foreign
countries during times of peace as political in nature and warranting
asylum.84 In response to the increase in terror-violence and in the trans-
national character of terrorist attacks, some states have enacted provi-
sions restricting the political offense exception to extradition. The Euro-
pean Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism,85 for example, limits
the availability of the political offense exception for specific crimes
characteristic of terror-violence-such as the use of explosives and ma-
chine guns-but does not define the components of a political offense or
terrorism. 6
United States extradition practice is limited by statute to bilateral
treaties.87 Although the treaties recognize the political offense excep-
tion, courts in the United States have construed this exception nar-
fere with the transmission of news). Although law enforcement often resents the por-
trayal of terrorists as ideological heroes, efforts to understand media and use media
access in rescue operations would reduce tension between reporters and policemen. Id.
84. Dinstein, Comments on the Fourth Interim Report of the ILA Committee on
International Terrorism, 7 TERRORISM: AN INT'L J. 163, 166 (1982) (noting the only
solution to this problem is to prohibit terrorists from receiving exemptions from extra-
dition regardless of political motives).
85. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, entered into force Oct.
25, 1978, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 93 (Cmd. 7390), Europ. T.S. No. 90, reprinted in 19
I.L.M. 325 (1980).
86. Id. The Organization of American States also enacted an Inter-American Con-
vention on Extradition that recognizes a broad political offense exception but declines
to define the exact limitations of the exception. Inter-American Convention on Extradi-
tion, opened for signature Feb. 25, 1981, O.A.S. Off. Doc. OEA/Ser. A/36, reprinted
in 20 I.L.M. 723, 772 (1982) [hereinafter OAS Extradition Convention]; see also
UNITED STATES DEP'T JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PROCEDURE FOR
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION (undated) (providing general guidelines for interna-
tional extradition requests).
87. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184, 3186-93 (1976) (outlining the scope and limitations
on the extradition practices in the United States).
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rowly. 8  In some treaties, such as the United States-United Kingdom
Extradition Treaty,89 Congress included additional provisions to deny
terrorists the use of the political exception. Limiting the availability of
political asylum and "safe havens" for terrorists is evidence that the
courts support the executive branch's mandate on fighting international
terrorism.90 Court decisions, however, have reached confusing conclu-
sions as to the applicability of the political offense doctrine. 1
In a recent extradition case involving an American citizen accused of
illegally using explosives and murdering an English constable, the court
attempted to clarify the political exception confusion, holding that
transnational terrorist activity is not protected under the political ex-
ception to extradition. 2 In Quinn v. United States,3 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Quinn failed to meet
the "incidence test." The test's requirements are: 1) that the crime is
related to a struggle to abolish a country's existing government; and 2)
that a crime is consequent to the uprising activity."' Although Quinn's
actions met the first part of the test, he committed the attack in ques-
tion in London, not Ireland, the country of the uprising. The court,
therefore, held that Quinn did not meet the second part of the test and
characterized his acts as international terrorism, depriving him the
privilege of the political offense exception. 5 The court espoused the ju-
88. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (citing cases interpreting the po-
litical offense exception to extradition very narrowly).
89. Extradition Treaty of June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T.
227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 (granting extradition for certain specified offenses, including
murder, attempted murder, and malicious wounding).
90. See infra note 92 and 94 (discussing the limitation of the political offense ex-
ception, denying terrorists "safe haven" unless their activity is limited to certain
circumstances).
91. See infra note 97 (discussing inconsistent court decisions on the applicability of
the political offense exception).
92. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 817 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
271 (1986) (stating that acts of international terrorism do not meet the incidence test
and are not protected by the political offense exception).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 796-97; cf. In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149, 159 (1890) (requiring that
the overt act concern the government and that the act is incidental to a political mat-
ter, uprising, or dispute between parties in the state). This test is presently used by the
United States for the determination of the political incidence characteristics of crimes.Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 797 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271
(1986) (noting that American courts continue to apply the incidence test set forth in In
re Castioni and In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894)). The test requires (1) the
occurrence of an uprising or violent political disturbance at the time of the charged
offense and (2) that the charged offense is incidental to, in the course of, or in further-
ance of the uprising. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d at 797.
95. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 813 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
271 (1986) (holding that the uprising component was not met because (1) the level of
violence outside of Northern Ireland was not sufficient to constitute an uprising and (2)
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diciary's committment to combatting international terrorism and re-
futed the government's argument that granting Quinn's request for po-
litical exception would recognize political terrorism and conflict with
executive policy.96
The court's opinion in Quinn noted the inconsistencies in prior court
decisions on the extradition of individuals accused of violent political
acts committed outside organized military conflict. 17 The court noted
the difficulty in reaching a consensus on the components of the political
offense exception but explained that the basic standards are refined on
a case-by-case basis. 98 Regardless of the inconsistent court decisions on
the political exception question, the United States unequivocally con-
demns all acts of international terror-violence and urges international
cooperation in the battle against terrorist activity.99 The court in Quinn
the violence was not generated by citizens or residents of England).
96. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 271 (1986) (determining that the judiciary could properly decide upon the appli-
cation of the political offense exception). The court contrasted the political pressure on
the executive branch concerning controversial international issues with the courts' ideo-
logical neutrality. Id. The executive branch retains the ultimate authority to decide
upon extradition-subject to treaty obligations-after the judiciary has made a deter-
mination on the offender's extraditability. Id. The court in Quinn, however, decided the
political exception issue, finding that judicial action did not infringe or limit the scope
of the executive branch's discretion. Id.
97. Id. at 803; see In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099MG, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Cal.
May 11, 1979) (denying an extradition request by the United Kingdom after conclud-
ing that an IRA bombing of military barracks in England was connected to a political
uprising and incidental to that uprising). But see Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776,
803-06 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271 (1986) (rejecting McMullen and
finding activity that constitutes international terrorism is not protected under the politi-
cal incidence test); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 520 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
894 (1981) (holding that the political conflict requirement of the test was met, but that
the random act of terrorism against indiscriminate targets was not incidental to the
conflict and thus not protected under the political offense exception); In re Mackin, 668
F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981) (recognizing the existence of a political conflict in Northern
Ireland when an IRA member murdered a British soldier in Belfast and finding the
offense incidental to the struggle).
The only real distinction between In re Mackin and In re McMullen was the situs of
the crime. On the basis of the "transcending of national borders" distinction, the Quinn
court would deny McMullen political exception from extradition because his acts would
constitute international terrorism. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 814 n.36 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271 (1986). Mackin, however, would still benefit from
the political offense exception because his acts targeted the government within North-
ern Ireland's national boundaries. Id. at 801-02. The court in Quinn, cooperating with
the executive branch in the fight against international terrorism, defined legitimate in-
surgent activity as activity that takes place within the national borders of the country
under attack. Id. at 817.
98. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 790 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
271 (1986).
99. Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ed-
wards, J. concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); see also 1984 Act to Com-
bat International Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 98-533, 98 Stat. 2706, § 201(a) (to be codi-
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calls for the limitation of the political uprising prong of the incidence
test to its historic purpose-when- those engaged in the violence are
seeking to accomplish a particular objective.100 The exception does not
apply to political acts that involve "less fundamental efforts" to accom-
plish change or efforts that do not involve a significant amount of tur-
moil.101 The decision in Quinn firmly denies any judicial role in making
judgments on the nature of foreign struggles because of the political
nature of such judgments.10 2 In certain incidents involving international
terrorism-not directly related to the struggle and occurring within the
national boundaries of the opposing government-courts will refuse the
political exception rather than define the political nature.
III. UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO TERRORISM
United States efforts to slow the rising tide of terrorism and the tak-
ing of hostages in the international community are exemplified by sup-
port for multilateral, bilateral, and regional treaties and conventions
calling for an end to international terror-violence and hostage-taking."0 3
Although these treaties and conventions purport to afford a more solid
jurisdictional basis, significant deficiencies still exist in the ability of
the United States government to prosecute international terrorists. One
such problem is the inability of states to acquire jurisdiction over ter-
rorists who victimize innocent civilians purely on the basis of national-
ity. Numerous illustrations of attacking innocents occurred in 1985-
86.101 Americans were abducted from ships, airplanes, and overseas
fled in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 41 U.S.C.) (condemning
international terrorism).
100. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 807 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 271 (1986) (finding that an uprising can only exist when "the turmoil that war-
rants characterization is created by nationals of the land in which the disturbances are
occurring").
101. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 798 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 271 (1986); see also Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1036 (1980) (denying the applicability of the political offense excep-
tion when the petitioner committed a politically motivated kidnapping). Unless the act
was "committed in the course of and incidental to a violent political distubance," the
court refused to apply the political offense exception. Id. at 1104.
102. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 817 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 271 (1986).
103. See infra note 127-28 (listing international conventions against aircraft hi-
jacking and crimes against internationally protected persons); supra note 30 (discussing
the Hostage Convention and additional measures to apprehend and prosecute
terrorists).
104. See Sofaer, Fighting Terrorism Through Law, 85 DEP'T ST. BuLL 38-42
(Oct. 1985) (describing incidents occurring in 1985, including the hijacking of TWA
Flight 847, the murder of United States Embassy guards and civilians in San Salvador,
the bombing of the Air India flight, the bombing at the Frankfurt airport, and the
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posts. A number of citizens were murdered, some remain in captivity,
and the fate of others is still unknown.
A. DOMESTIC LEGISLATION
Responding to terrorist activity directed at Americans, the United
States enacted the Hostage Taking Act.105 Although the Act does not
impose sanctions against terrorism per se,'0 6 it was drafted to remedy
specific problems of terrorism that pose the greatest threats to Ameri-
can citizens.10 7 The United States also enacted anti-terrorist legislation,
imposing economic sanctions and authorizing surveillance activities, 08
Achille Lauro incident); see also Hostage Incidents: Examples in Modern History, 81
DEP'T ST. BULL. 23 (Mar. 1981) (listing international incidents of hostage-taking and
terror-violence occurring over the past century).
105. Hostage Taking Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2186 (1984) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1203) [hereinafter Hostage Taking Act] (upholding jurisdic-
tion over terrorists who seize or detain a national of the United States). Other federal
legislation enacted to combat terrorist related activity includes the Anti-hijacking Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 409 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.) (imposing criminal sanctions for persons convicted of hijacking or attempting
to hijack); The 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 98-533, 98
Stat. 2706 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3071-76 (1984)) (authorizing rewards for
information concerning terrorist acts); Antiterrorism Assistance Program Pub. L. No.
99-83, 99 Stat. 219 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 501 (1985)) (authorizing appropriations
for the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program); Prosecution Bills, supra note 19 (consid-
ering three proposed bills that authorize prosecution for terrorists who attack or kill
United States personnel and citizens abroad). The three bills would amend title 18 of
the United States Code and apply harsher sanctions to diffuse terrorist activities. S.
1373 would authorize prosecution of persons who attack United States government em-
ployees abroad. S. 1373, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). The second bill, S. 1429, would
authorize the prosecution of terrorists who attack United States nationals abroad. S.
1429, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). Finally, S. 1508 proposes the death penalty for first
degree terrorist murder. S. 1508, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
106. Ludington, Validity and Construction of Terroristic Threat Statutes, 45
A.L.R. 4TH 949, 954-88 (1986) (noting that Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Texas have enacted legis-
lation against terrorist threats, but that such statutes have little effect on the govern-
ment's foreign policy toward terrorism); see Legal Controls and Deterrence of Terror-
ism: Performance and Prospects, 13 RUTGERS L. J. 465, 466 (1982) (finding that most
terrorist acts are prosecuted under federal or state criminal codes covering homicide,
kidnapping, bombing, assault, battery, or other common crimes rather than a federal
statute establishing a crime of terrorism).
107. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing an approach to terror-
ism that sanctions specific acts as crimes, avoiding definitional problems by considering
the activity instead of the motivation).
108. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729, 753 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (1976)) (providing for
withdrawal of United States assistance to countries that support terrorism); Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1986) (codi-
fied at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811) (authorizing increased surveillance of suspected ter-
rorist groups). The Surveillance Act allows for surveillance of activities that "involve
violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal law of
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and proposed legislation on collecting information to prohibit the sup-
port of terrorist groups."0 9
Most federal legislation addressing terrorist activity is designed to
allow the United States to perform its obligations under international
treaties. 110 The Hostage Taking Act, enabling the United States to act
under the Hostage Convention, provides for passive personality juris-
diction. The use of passive personality jurisdiction is inconsistent with
traditional United States foreign policy, repudiating the principle as a
valid base of international jurisdiction."' 1 The effectiveness of the Hos-
tage Taking Act will depend on the ability of the United States to as-
sert jurisdiction over the accused terrorists1 1 2-a problem that weakens
the Act's impact due to the United States' inability to overcome the
protective veil of asylum and political refuge.
The frustration of the United States with the inability to prosecute
terrorists has provoked a number of legislative responses. 13 The most
the United States or of any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed
within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state." Id. at § 1801. The Act spe-
cifically requires that the conflict occur totally outside the United States to ensure the
international dimension. Id. at § 1801(c)(3).
109. See United States Offers Rewards for Terrorists, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 77
(Dec. 1985) (mentioning the 1984 Act to Combat Terrorism provisions to reward per-
sons that provide information on terrorists). The Articles for Rewards for Information
Concerning Terrorist Acts, appropriating rewards for information concerning unautho-
rized activities, and the Prohibition Against the Training or Support of Terrorist Orga-
nizations Act of 1984, both seek to prevent support of terrorist activity. Id.
110. See Note, U.S. Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legal-
ized Kidnapping? 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 915, 921 (1985) [hereinafter Note, US.
Legislation] (discussing the limitations on the extraterritorial effect of domestic law).
111. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text (questioning the use of the
passive personality principle as a valid, independent basis of jurisdiction under United
States law).
112. Note, U.S. Legislation, supra note 110, at 950 (noting that personal jurisdic-
tion must be obtained before terrorism can be tried in a United States court).
113. See H.R. 4737, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (introducing legislation to in-
crease international cooperation in the fight against international terrorism); H.R.
4611, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (introducing legislation to protect United States
citizens from terrorism); H.R. 4418, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (introducing legisla-
tion to enhance diplomatic security and combat international terrorism); H.R. 4307,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (introducing legislation to protect against international
nuclear terrorism); H.R. 4294, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (introducing legislation to
amend Title 18 of the United States Code to provide additional means of combatting
terrorism); H.R. 4044, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (introducing legislation to amend
Title 18 of the United States Code and the State Department Basic Authority Act of
1956 to increase the amount of awards for information on terrorist activity and to
create a most wanted terrorist list); S. 2335, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (introducing
legislation to protect United States citizens against terrorism); S. 1940, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985) (introducing legislation to protect the security of the United States by
creating the offense of international terrorism); S. 1915, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)
(introducing legislation to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to provide special
assistance to Central American countries fighting terrorism); H.R. 3704, 99th Cong.,
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promising bill, the Terrorist Prosecution Act,1 14 passed in the Senate on
February 19, 1986 by a ninety-two-to-zero vote.""5 The bill "provide[s]
for the prosecution and punishment of persons who, in furtherance of
terrorist activities or because of the nationality of the victims, commit
violent attacks upon Americans outside the United States or conspire
outside of the United States to murder Americans within the United
States."11 The bill does not define terrrorism, avoiding problems asso-
ciated with reaching a consensus on an acceptable definition of interna-
tional terrorism.1 17 The bill also extends jurisdiction to crimes con-
spired outside the United States but committed within its territory.11 8
The Act is based on the protective principle of jurisdiction, 1 9 allowing
extraterritorial extension of laws when conduct threatens state security
or government functions. 120 The main problem with this approach is
that many attacks will not meet the jurisdictional requirements of the
protective principle, especially random attacks against Americans that
are not specifically targeted, but are among a group that is attacked.12 1
1st Sess. (1985) (introducing legislation to protect United States citizens and property
from state-sponsored terrorism); H.R. 3463, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) (introducing
legislation authorizing assistance to Central American countries fighting terrorism);
H.R. 3330, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introducing legislation on nuclear power
plant security and anti-terrorism); S. 1757, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introducing
legislation to combat terrorism in Central America); S. 275, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.(1985) (introducing legislation to protect the internal security of the United States by
creating the offense of terrorism).
114. S. 1429, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S1382-88 (1986) [hereinafter
Terrorist Prosecution Act]. The bill is a modified version of the Terrorist Prosecution
Act considered by the Senate in 1985. S. 1429, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONa. REC.
S9430-32 (1985). The new bill is much narrower in scope than the 1985 bill, grantingjurisdiction to the United States to try anyone assaulting or murdering a United States
citizen abroad if the attack was the result of international terrorism. Id. at S9430.
115. Id.
116. Id. at § 2331(0.
117. Note, U.S. Legislation, supra note 110, at 954.
118. Id.
119. Terrorist Prosecution Act, supra note 114, at S1383. The act states that:
(b) it is an accepted principle of international law that a country may prose-
cute crimes committed outside its boundaries that are directed against its own
security or the operation of its governmental functions.
Id.
120. Id.
121. See Note, U.S. Legislation, supra note 110, at 955 (discussing problems with
exercising protective jurisdiction under the Terrorist Prosecution Act when the nexus
between the attack and the threat to United States national security or government
functions is tenuous). When the attack clearly targets Americans, in a hostage-taking
incident for example, the Hostage Taking Act will cover the activity, making coverage
under the Terrorist Prosecution Act superfluous. Id.; see also Terrorism Legislation,
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-50(1986) (statement of Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal
Division, United States Department of Justice). Trott urges the House of Representa-
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The progress of the United States in enacting domestic legislation to
combat terrorism will not stop the increase in terrorist activity unless
effective international measures are also adopted.
B. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES
Although an international consensus on the definition of terrorism is
unlikely, if a majority of states could agree on which terrorist activities
are intolerable, then effective sanctions could prohibit such activities. 22
A multilateral treaty signed by many nations agreeing on the compo-
nents of the illegal offense would offer the most effective international
barrier to recurring terrorist strikes.1 23 Although the Committee on In-
ternational Terrorism of the International Law Association attempted
to draft a single convention against international terrorism, the many
problems that arose forced the Committee to abandon the goal of a
single convention. 24 Even if signatory states compose a majority of
world nations, when certain states plagued by a large percentage of
terrorist attacks do not sign the treaty, sanctions are useless. Regard-
less, reaching an international consensus on sanctions for terrorist ac-
tivity will increase the chances of intercepting terrorists operating
outside of their protective spheres.
On January 6, 1985, the United States signed the United Nations
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 25 in an effort to combat
the increasing number of terrorist incidents in which the perpetrators
are not extraditable to a state with jurisdiction to prosecute. The hesi-
tation of some states to sign the Convention, the narrow interpretation
of its scope, and the continuing successful escape of terrorists from
prosecution, have reduced the role of the Convention in the interna-
tives to pass S. 1429 to provide for the prosecution of terrorists who kill United States
citizens abroad. Id. He notes that federal law already protects federal officials, but
neglects citizens and civil personnel not attached to an embassy. Id. at 49-50.
122. See generally OAS Terrorism Convention, infra note 128 and the Hostage
Convention, supra note 30 (inviting strict measures to prevent certain acts of interna-
tional terrorism); European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, entered into
force Oct. 25, 1978, art. IV, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 93 (Cmd. 7390), Europ. T.S. No.
90, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976) (proclaiming that there are limitations to what
the international community will tolerate from terrorists).
123. Evans, American Policy Response to International Terrorism: Problems of
Deterrence, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 376, 382
(M. Livingston, L. Kress & M. Wanek eds. 1978) (discussing the possibility of multi-
lateral action against international terrorism and stating that effective action will re-
quire political concessions from states).
124. Fourth Report, supra note 18, at 123. Specific problems the Committee en-
countered include the definition of international terrorism, id. at 133, and the compari-
son of acts of terrorism with acts forbidden during armed conflict. Id. at 135.
125. Hostage Convention, supra note 30.
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tional fight against terrorism.'26 To combat the increasing terrorist di-
lemma, the United States has enacted legislation and signed interna-
tional treaties that impose sanctions against people who hijack
aircraft, 27 threaten the lives of internationally protected persons, 28
and most recently, against persons who take hostages. 129 Additional ev-
idence of the emerging commitment of the United States to end terror-
violence is exemplified by developments in foreign policy.
126. Sofaer, Fighting Terrorism Through Law, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 38 (Oct.
1985). Sofaer notes the American government's frustration with several nations' refusal
to comply with anti-hijacking conventions and with nations who are unable to carry out
their obligations under anti-terrorism conventions. Id. Although the United States
signed the Hostage Convention in 1985, it had previously voted against enactment of
the proposed Convention because it did not consider the language strong enough. Ro-
senstock, International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages: Another Interna-
tional Community Step Against Terrorism, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 169, 170 n.26
(1980) [hereinafter Rosenstock]; see Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction Over Extra-
territorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1141 (1982) [hereinafter
Blakesley] (noting the United States refusal to support the United Nations Draft Reso-
lution Regarding Terrorism, 14 U.N. GAOR at 355, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3034 (1972),
because of its weak position on prosecuting terrorists); see also 68 DEP'T ST. BULL. 81
(1973) (reporting United States representatives' remarks during the United Nations
General Assembly consideration of a resolution calling for the study of terrorism).
127. See, e.g., Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft, opened for signature Sept. 14, 1963, 10 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (prohibiting certain offenses and other acts on board aircraft);
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), openedfor signature Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, reprinted in 10 I.L.M.
133 (1971) (prohibiting unlawful seizure of aircraft and imposing severe penalties upon
persons convicted of aircraft piracy); The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), opened for signature Sept. 23,
1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 1151 (1971) (prohibit-
ing acts of violence which endanger the safety of aircraft and imposing severe penalties
upon persons convicted of those crimes); Anti-hijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
366, 88 Stat. 409 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) (levying severe criminal
sanctions upon persons convicted of hijacking or attempting to hijack aircraft).
128. See Convention on the Protection and Punishment of Crimes Against Interna-
tionally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature Dec. 14,
1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167, G.A. Res. 3166, 28
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 146, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) [hereinafter Conven-
tion on Protected Persons] (imposing severe sanctions for crimes against internationally
protected persons); Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of International Terror-
ism Taking Forms of Crimes Against Persons and Relating Extortion That Are of In-
ternational Significance, opened for signature Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S.
No. 8413, O.A.S.T.S. No. 37, at 6, O.A.S. Off. Doc. OEA/Ser. A/17 [hereinafter
OAS Terrorism Convention]; Act for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Pub. L. No. 94-467, 90 Stat. 2000 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 878 (1976)) (providing severe sanctions for persons convicted of crimes
against internationally protected persons).
129. Hostage Convention, supra note 30.
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C. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: ADAPTING TO
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
The recent surge in terror-violence against American citizens has
caused a reevaluation of the United States foreign policy responses to
international terrorism.1 30 The United States traditionally approached
terrorist threats against its citizens by using one of its three meth-
ods-international legal principles, domestic legislation, or interna-
tional agreements. Official statements noting frustration with the
spreading threat of terrorist activity and calling for stricter measures of
extradition and prosecution support a change in foreign policy.1 31 The
United States is reinforcing its tough position on terrorism, enacting
domestic laws that encompass most forms of terrorist activity.1 32
No international consensus exists on what constitutes "justifiable ac-
tivity" for groups struggling for self-determination. According to
United States foreign policy, however, kidnapping and killing innocent
civilians is clearly unacceptable activity.133 The strengthening of
United States foreign policy, illustrated by a lack of tolerance for vio-
lent terrorist activity, is in reaction to the development of violent means
employed by terrorists to call attention to their respective causes.' 3'
Although United States foreign policy clearly condemns certain ac-
130. A This World Symposium-Terrorism: What Should We Do?, THIS WORLD
31, 31 (1985) [hereinafter This World] (noting that thirty to thirty-five percent of
international terrorist attacks are against United States citizens and interests and that
the attacks will probably become increasingly violent).
131. See Terrorists Seize Cruise Ship in Mediterranean, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 74
(Oct. 1985) (reporting statements by President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, William
Webster, and Abraham Sofaer condemning terrorism and calling for the extradition
and prosecution of all hostage-takers in the Achille Lauro incident).
132. See Hostage Taking Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2186 (1984) (amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1203) (providing that whoever takes United States citizens hostage,
inside or outside the United States, shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of
years to life); The 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 98-533,
98 Stat. 2706 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3071-76 (1984)) (authorizing rewards for in-
formation concerning terrorist acts); International Security and Development Coopera-
tion Act of 1985, tit. V, International Terrorism and Foreign Airport Security, Antiter-
rorism Assistance Program § 501, Pub. L. No. 99-83, 99 Stat. 219 (1985) (codified at
22 U.S.C. § 2349aa) (authorizing appropriations for the Anti-Terrorism Assistance
Program); see also H.R. Con. Res. 228, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (condemning all
acts of terrorism and calling for the creation of an international coordination commit-
tee on terrorism); supra note 113 (citing additional proposed legislation to combat
terrorism).
133. See Terrorists Seize Cruise Ship in the Mediterranean, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL
74, 81 (Oct. 1985) (condemning the kidnapping of American passengers and the mur-
der of Leon Klinghoffer by Palestinian terrorists in the Achille Lauro incident).
134. Willenz, U.S. Policy on Terrorism: In Search of an Answer, 9 TERRORES.,:
AN INT'L JOURNAL 225, 225-26 (1987).
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tivity by terrorists,13 5 the lack of definite guidelines on acceptable reac-
tions to attacks invites terrorists to continue targeting American citi-
zens and interests around the world.13 The inconsistency of United
States foreign policy on interaction with terrorists is illustrated by the
arms-for-hostages swap with Iran.'37 One of the foundations of United
States foreign policy was the government's refusal to make concessions
to terrorists." 8 By trading arms for hostages, the Reagan administra-
tion undermined its policy of no concessions to terrorists.1 9 The United
States government must go beyond advocating a strict policy in com-
batting terrorism and adopt guidelines on legal measures, reprisal and
retribution, and the risks of war that the United States is willing to
assume when confronting state-sponsored terrorism. 4 Until United
States policy-makers establish these guidelines, foreign policy initia-
tives will continue to portray strong ideas with weak results. 41 Comple-
menting the United States vehement condemnation of terrorism,
United States courts have considered a broad jurisdictional approach to
the problem of prosecuting terrorists.
IV. A JURISDICTIONAL RESPONSE TO TERRORISM
There are five generally recognized theories of criminal jurisdiction
in international law:142 the territorial, protective, nationality, universal,
135. See Lynch, supra note 4, at 74 (quoting Robert B. Oakley, Director of the
Office for Counter-Terrorism and Energy Planning, Department of State). Oakley
states that United States policy is direct, that the United States will not pay ransom,
abridge United States policy, or endanger democratic principles. Id. But see Reagan
Acknowledges Arms-for-Hostages Swap, Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 1987, at A12 [hereinaf-
ter Arms-for-Hostages] (discussing the violation of established foreign policy when the
United States sold arms to Iran to secure the release of hostages).
136. Lynch, supra note 4, at 1.
137. See Arms-for-Hostages supra note 135, at 1, col. 1 (reporting President Rea-
gan's acknowledgment that the trading of arms-for-hostages with Iran conflicted with
United States policy of not bargaining with terrorists for the freedom of hostages).
138. Lynch, supra note 4, at 74.
139. Arms-for-Hostages, supra note 135, at A12. In his March 4th address to the
nation, President Reagan stated that:
[W]hat began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated in its implementation
into trading arms for hostages. This runs counter to my own beliefs, to adminis-
tration policy, and to the original strategy we had in mind. There are reasons
why it happened, but no excuses. It was a mistake.
Id.
140. Lynch, supra note 4, at 75.
141. See id. at 83-85 (noting that the development of a coherent foreign policy
would have a positive effect domestically and internationally). The development of such
a policy may also educate the American public and elicit increased support for mea-
sures to combat terrorist activity. Id.
142. Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime,
29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 435 (1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research]; RESTATEMENT
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and passive personality principles. The territorial principle grants juris-
diction when the crime occurs within the territory of a state. 4 A de-
rivative theory of territorial jurisdiction, the "floating territorial princi-
ple," affords jurisdiction over offenses occurring on a state's ship or
aircraft."" The protective principle provides for jurisdiction where the
effect of the crime threatens the national interests of a state.1"" The
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 10 (1965) [herein-
after RESTATEMENT]. United States federal and state law and many treaties in intcrna-
tional law have adopted the Harvard Research designation. See, e.g., Rivard v. United
States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967) (discussing the
five principles of jurisdiction according to the law of nations); United States v. Rodri-
guez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 487 (S.D. Cal. 1960), aff'd sub nona. Rocha v. United States,
288 F.2d 545, 549 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961) (discussing the
nature of criminal jurisdiction under international law); RESTATEMENT, supra, at §§
10-19 (mentioning the territorial, nationality, protective, and universal principles, but
not the passive personality principle of international jurisdiction); RESTATE.MrENT
DRAFr, supra note 14, at § 402 and comments c-h (discussing the five principles of
jurisdiction under international law, and acknowledging that the validity of the passive
personality is still in dispute); Feller, Jurisdiction Over Offenses With a Foreign Ele-
ment, in 2 INT'L CRIM. LAW. 5 (M. Bassioni & V. Nada eds. 1973) (describing the
territorial, protective, universal, active personality and passive personality principles of
jurisdiction); B. WESTON, T. FALK & A. D'AMATo, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER 564 (1983) (describing the five general principles of international jurisdiction).
143. See Harvard Research, supra note 142, at 495 (stating that territorial juris-
diction exists whenever a crime is committed "in whole and in part" within a territory).
There are two types of territorial jurisdiction, the subjective and the objective. Paust,
supra note 22, at 203. Subjective territorial jurisdiction extends to acts committed
outside of the United States when a constituent element occurs within the territory. Id.
Objective territorial jurisdiction extends to extraterritorial conduct having harmful ef-
fects occurring within national boundaries. See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285
(1911) (allowing the State of Michigan to prosecute although the defendant entered
the State only after the crimes transpired).
Traditionally, the United States perceived territorial jurisdiction as granting exclu-
sive sovereignty within a state's territory, unless that state consented to another state's
actions within its national boundaries. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
144. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584 (1953) (holding that the floating
territorial principle will only apply where the ship is a flagship of a state and/or the
ship is within a state's territorial waters); Empson, The Application of Criminal Law
to Acts Committed Outside the Jurisdiction, 6 &1. CRmI. L. Q. 32, 38 (1967) (noting
that the United States has applied the "law of the flag" principle); Note, Jurisdiction,
15 TEX. INT'L L. J. 403, 404 n.3 (1980) (noting that the protective principle is recog-
nized by most states and that United States courts have long held that jurisdiction
must either be supported by the protective or objective territorial principle where the
act is committed by an alien on foreign soil); George, Extraterritorial Application of
Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REV. 609, 613 (1966) (discussing the floating territo-
rial principle, the necessary existence of a nation's law on board a vessel, and the inade-
quacy of that law depending upon the location of the vessel).
145. RESTATEMENT DRAFr, supra note 14, at § 402(3) (providing jurisdiction over
extraterritorial conduct directed against the security or interest of persons other than
nationals). See Harvard Research, supra note 142, at 440 (stating that a state hasjurisdiction with respect to any crime committed outside of its territory which is di-
rected against the security of the state); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10
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nationality theory affords a state jurisdiction if the person committing
the crime is a national of that state, wherever the crime takes place.1 40
The universal principle allows jurisdiction in any forum that has per-
sonal jurisdiction over the perpetrator for universally recognized hei-
nous crimes. 147 The passive personality theory grants jurisdiction on the
basis of the victim's nationality.148
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968) (applying the protective principle to
the crime of making a false oath in a visa application although committed abroad);
Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 549 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948
(1961) (upholding jurisdiction under the protective principle over immigrants who
made unlawful entry, claiming preferred status as husbands of United States brides
through sham marriages); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 215-16 (N.D.
Cal. 1981) (noting that the United States has extraterritorial jurisdiction under the
protective principle over those involved in a conspiracy in Guyana to murder Congress-
man Ryan); United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 635 (D.P.R. 1978) (upholding
jurisdiction under the protective principle when the national interest of the United
States is injured by a conspiracy to import illegal drugs); United States v. Archer, 51
F. Supp. 708, 711 (S.D. Cal. 1943) (upholding the protective principle for harm
against the sovereignty of the United States when an immigrant signed a false oath for
immigration purposes); see also Blakesley, supra note 126, at 1132-39 (describing the
offenses that give rise to protective principle jurisdiction as potentially harming specific
national interests). Unlike the objective or subjective territorial principles, the protec-
tive principle provides jurisdiction over offenses committed entirely outside the territory
of the forum state, even without any effect within the territory, if the offenses might
adversely affect the state's security, integrity, sovereignty, or governmental function.
Id. at 1136.
146. See, e.g., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73, 77 (1941) (holding that the
United States may control the conduct of citizens on the high seas in matters in which
the state has a legitimate interest); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437
(1932) (upholding nationality jurisdiction over a citizen convicted of contemptuous dis-
obedience of two subpoenas in a criminal case and requiring the return of the United
States citizen living abroad); Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 54, 56 (1924) (allowing Con-
gress to tax income received by a United States citizen from property situated outside
the United States); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922) (holding that
United States citizens on the high seas are subject to criminal prosecution for fraud
under the nationality principle); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 215-16
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (affording the United States jurisdiction over a citizen accused of
committing crimes abroad).
147. See infra notes 187-93 and accompanying text (discussing the universal prin-
ciple of jurisdiction).
148. Harvard Research, supra note 142, at 445. Historically the United States has
rejected the passive personality principle as a valid base of international jurisdiction.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 142, at § 30(2) comment e (stating that jurisdiction
should not be granted over an alien of the state seeking prosecution solely on the basis
of the victim's nationality); see also The Cutting Case, 1887 FOR. REL. 751 (1888),
reported in 2 J. MOORE, INT'L L. DIG. 228 (1906) [hereinafter J. MOORE]. In Cutting,
Mexican police arrested and jailed an American for crimes allegedly committed against
a Mexican national in Texas. Id. The United States Secretary of State filed a protest
that:
[T]here is no principle better settled than that the penal laws of one country
have no extraterritorial force . . . . To say that the penal laws of a country can
bind foreigners and regulate their conduct, either in their own or any other for-
eign country, is to assert jurisdiction over such countries and to impair their
[VOL. 2:153
HOSTAGE-TAKING
In response to the international controversy regarding the most effec-
tive means of dealing with the threat of terrorism, the United States
has taken the initiative and is broadly interpreting the jurisdictional
provisions of both the Hostage Convention and the Hostage Taking Act
in an effort to obtain jurisdiction when terrorist acts are committed
against American nationals abroad. United States courts have never
sanctioned the exercise of international jurisdiction based solely on the
nationality of the victims.1 49 As a response to the increase in interna-
tional terrorism, however, the United States is sanctioning the use of
the passive personality principle of criminal jurisdiction"'0 that it has
historically condemned on an international level because of its potential
to violate sovereign rights.151
This shifting policy involves the possible assertion of jurisdiction over
hostage-takers under either the universal 5 2 or passive personality prin-
ciple 153 of jurisdiction when no previously recognized means of jurisdic-
tion will provide for prosecution of the perpetrators. Recent official
statements and developments in foreign relations law suggest that the
United States is prepared to employ either principle of jurisdiction to
eliminate the proliferation of terrorist violence in the international
community.15
independence.
J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 95, 97 (2d
ed. 1981) (reporting the Cutting case as a landmark holding rejecting the passive per-
sonality principle). The holding in Cutting repudiated the passive personality principle
as a valid base of jurisdiction in international law. J. MOORE, supra, at 236.
149. See United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 1979)
(rejecting the passive personality principle as a valid base of jurisdiction). But see
States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1984) (convicting a non-United States
citizen in the United States for conspiracy to murder, assault, and rob United States
Drug Enforcement Agents in Colombia). The court relied on Rivard and Layton to
support the existence of the protective and passive personality principles. Id. at 1316;
see also United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1381 (11th Cir. 1972) (find-
ing that the passive personality may be employed to gain jurisdiction over persons or
vessels that injure citizens of a foreign country).
150. But cf. United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 216 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
(stating that the court has the power to rely on the passive personality principle, but
avoiding the question of whether this principle alone is sufficient to grant jurisdiction).
151. RESTATEMENT, supra note 142, at § 30(2) (stating that the United States does
not have jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law attaching legal consequences to the con-
duct of aliens outside of its territory on the basis that the victim is a United States
national).
152. See infra note 193 (providing cases that employ the universal principle to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over persons committing crimes that have an independent basis in
international law).
153. See infra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing the limited acceptance
of the passive personality principle in the Restatement Draft of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States).
154. Sofaer, Fighting Terrorism Through Law, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL 38, 41-42
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A. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: AN
INDICATION OF LIMITED ACCEPTANCE
The 1985 Draft of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law re-
states the traditional bases of jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime.',"
The Restatement Draft mentions both the passive personality princi-
ple156 and the universal principle 157 as potential sources of jurisdiction
over terrorist activity and hostage-taking in particular.1 58 The recogni-
tion of these bases of international jurisdiction indicate a change in
United States foreign policy. United States foreign policy traditionally
rejected the use of the passive personality principle'5" as a basis of in-
ternational jurisdiction and limited the universal principle to certain
crimes.' 60
The 1985 Restatement Draft of Foreign Relations Law delineates
both the passive personality and the universal theories of jurisdiction as
potential means of dealing with the problems of terrorism.'6 United
States foreign policy on the actual use of the passive personality princi-
(Oct. 1985) (calling for "meaningful" enforcement mechanisms, sanctions, amendment
of extradition treaties to exclude international terrorism from the political exception to
extradition, enforcement of international law, technological advances, and endurance in
the struggle against terrorism).
155. RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 14, at § 403. The Restatement Draft notes
that a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to: 1) conduct which takes
place within the territory (or a substantial part of which takes place within the terri-
tory); 2) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory; 3)
conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to have a substantial effect within
the territory; and 4) the activities, status, interests or relations of its nationals outside
as well as within its territory and certain conduct outside the territory by non-nationals
which is directed against state security or a limited class of other state interests. Id.
156. See id. at § 402 comment g (mentioning the passive personality principle of
jurisdiction as an increasingly acceptable basis of jurisdiction if a terrorist act is com-
mitted against "a State national by reason of their nationality" or against civil servants
of the state). The comment, however, does not state that the drafters considered the
passive personality principle a valid basis of jurisdiction. Id.
157. Id. at § 404 (discussing the possible use of the universal principle to obtain
jurisdiction over terrorists).
158. Id. (stating that "perhaps" terrorism will be recognized under universal juris-
diction "even where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is present").
Commentary to § 404 notes that the disagreement on the definition of terrorism is a
substantial factor preventing the enactment of any internationally acceptable and effec-
tive sanctions. Id. at § 404 comment a. The United States is shifting its policy toward
classifying certain aspects of terrorist activity under the universal principle instead of
increasingly broadening its acceptance of the passive personality principle.
159. See supra note 148-49 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional re-
jection of the passive personality principle in United States and international law).
160. See infra note 189-92 and accompanying text (listing crimes that the interna-
tional community considers of universal dimension).
161. See RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 14, at § 402 comment g (noting the
possible use of the passive personality principle against hostage-taking); see also id. at
§ 404 (discussing the universal principle's potential to reach certain acts of terrorism).
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ple will remain unclear until the government has the opportunity to
assert such jurisdiction without violating another state's sovereign
rights. In most cases, this will require the consent of the state in ques-
tion. Where one of the parties involved does not recognize the validity
of the passive personality principle or consent to its use, there is poten-
tial for conflict.
B. THE PASSIVE PERSONALITY PRINCIPLE
The passive personality principle is not internationally accepted as a
valid principle of jurisdiction because of its potential to violate sover-
eign rights.162 Few states have relied on the passive personality princi-
ple as an acceptable means of gaining jurisdiction. 6 3 Only a few states
recognize this theory of jurisdiction as a valid principle of international
law.les Nonetheless, recent attacks against government officials and
civil servants travelling and working abroad have modified the United
States historical rejection of the passive personality principle as a valid
base of international jurisdiction. In United States v. Layton,100 the
162. Note, U.S. Legislation, supra note 110, at 935. Even when the jurisdictional
basis is sound, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in a foreign state's territory may
violate international law and state sovereignty. Id.; see also Paust, supra note 22, at
202 (stating that the United States, along with most other states, has rejected the pas-
sive personality principle as a valid principle of international law); Blakesley, A Con-
ceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime, 4
UTAH L. REV. 685, 715 (1984) (discussing the rejection of the passive personality prin-
ciple by United States authorities as a matter of foreign policy).
American courts have also rejected the passive personality principle because of its
potential to violate the right of state sovereignty. Id. But see Sofaer, Terrorism and
Law, supra note 2, at 919 (stating that nations should not only consider the principle of
territorial sovereignty but also states' duties to cooperate, extradite, and prosecute
terrorists).
163. Paust, supra note 22, at 191, 202; see also United States v. Columba-Colella,
604 F.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversing the conviction of a foreigner for receiving
a stolen vehicle in foreign commerce). The court held that Congress did not intend to
assert foreign jurisdiction under the statute and that "Congress would not be compe-
tent to attach criminal sanctions to the murder of an American by a foreign national in
a foreign country, . . ." Id. at 360. The court rejects the use of the passive personality
principle, finding the defendants acts beyond its competence to proscribe. Id.; see also
Note, An Analysis of the Achille Lauro Affair: Towards an Effective and Legal
Method of Bringing International Terrorists to Justice, 9 FORDHAM Im"L L. J. 328,
342 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Achille Lauro Affair] (stating that the United States
does not recognize the passive personality theory as a valid base of international
jurisdiction).
164. Paust, supra note 22, at 202 n.43 (noting that only Germany, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Mexico and Turkey recognize the passive personality as a valid principle of
international law).
165. United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. Cal. 1981). In Layton,
the United States sought jurisdiction over Laurence Layton for the murder of Con-
gressman Leo Ryan in the Republic of Guyana. Id. at 217. The court specifically
stated that the protective, territorial, passive personality, and nationality principles give
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court accepted the passive personality principle for the limited purpose
of obtaining jurisdiction over terrorists who killed a member of Con-
gress and were not covered by any other jurisdictional principle. The
United States jurisdictional response to terrorist activity has been re-
tarded by problems associated with asserting jurisdiction over terrorists
and difficulties in reaching a consensus in the international community
on the definition of terrorism."'
The hesitancy of the United States to enact domestic legislation and
ratify international treaties adopting the passive personality principle is
understandable, as the government has traditionally found exercise of
this theory repugnant to the principle of sovereignty.""1 If the United
States did recognize the passive personality principle as a valid base of
international jurisdiction, then the principle may be used to prosecute
citizens committing crimes on the basis of the nationality of the victim.
The historical rejection of this principle is established in the Cutting
Case.168 Unlike the accusation of criminal libel in the Cutting Case,
however, the taking of hostages is more amenable to the application of
the passive personality principle because many of the attacks are com-
Congress the power to authorize extra-territorial jurisdiction. Id. at 216. The court
relied on Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
884 (1967) and United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960), afjfd
sub nom. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948
(1961), requiring no actual effect to take place within national boundaries and noting
that a potential effect will suffice. The court declined, however, to rule on the issue of
whether the passive personality principle, standing alone, would be a sufficient basis of
jurisdiction. United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. at 214. The opinion does note that
United States courts have repeatedly upheld the power of Congress to attach extrater-
ritorial effect to its penal statutes. Id. at 215; see also United States v. King, 552 F.2d
833, 851 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977) (holding that the territo-
rial principle is neither exclusive nor a completely accurate description of a state's
power to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d
10, 10 n.5 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968) (upholding extraterritorial
jurisdiction necessary to carry out Congressional power over the conduct of foreign
relations). The courts in both King and Pizzarusso noted the passive personality princi-
ple of jurisdiction but chose to decide the cases on more recognized jurisdictional
grounds. See also Comment, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of Federal Criminal Law:
The Assassination of Congressman Ryan, 14 LAw. AM. 61, 62-67 (1982) (discussing
extraterritorial jurisdiction under United States and international law and noting that
the passive personality principle has little support in United States case law).
166. W. FARRELL, supra note 33, at 6-18. The author recognizes the problem of
defining terrorism and notes that the definition depends upon the point of view of the
state or person. The definition of "[tierrorism, like beauty, remains in the eye of the
beholder." Id. at 11.
167. See supra note 162 (describing the use of the passive personality principle as
repugnant to the principle of sovereignty).
168. See supra note 148 (describing the Cutting Case as rejecting the passive per-
sonality principle).
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mitted purely on the basis of the victim's nationality."' A crime com-
mitted against a citizen solely on the basis of nationality warrants juris-
diction on the basis of the passive personality principle, especially
where no other basis for jurisdiction exists.1" If the United States gov-
ernment applies this theory to hostage-taking, it should act as the ex-
ception to the general rejection of the passive personality principle,
rather than an extension of the principle to other types of criminal
activity. 7 1
United States courts mention the passive personality principle in sev-
eral opinions but do not recognize its international validity as an inde-
pendent basis of jurisdiction.1 72 Although courts have hesitated to
adopt the principle as an independent basis of jurisdiction, 3  the
United States has signed the United Nations Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages17 4 and enacted the Hostage Taking Act 7 5 that
both explicitly recognize the passive personality principle."' The enact-
ment of the Hostage Taking Act and the ratification of the Hostage
Convention indicate that the United States accepts the passive person-
ality principle for the limited purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over ter-
rorists who take United States citizens hostage. To date, however, the
United States has not explicitly asserted this principle to gain jurisdic-
tion over terrorists due to problems of concurrent jurisdiction.1 77 The
169. RESTATEMENT DRAFr, supra note 14, at § 402 comment g (finding the passive
personality principle increasingly acceptable when applied to terrorist attacks on states'
nationals by reason of their nationality).
170. Id.
171. Cf. Fourth Report, supra note 18, at 126 (discussing the difficulties of defin-
ing offenses that would warrant a state to act against political fugitives committing
violent acts abroad solely against foreigners for a cause which that state supports).
Contra Dissenting Statement by Professor LC. Green and Dr. J. Lador-Lederer, id. at
132 (finding that the passive personality principle is not a "doubtful legal basis" and
that terrorism is not the first crime in which criminal jurisdiction is based on the na-
tionality of the victim).
172. See supra note 149-50 (listing cases in which the United States has considered
the use of the passive personality principle).
173. See id. (discussing the rejection of the passive personality principle as an inde-
pendent basis of jurisdiction).
174. Hostage Convention, supra note 30, at art. 5(l)(d).
175. Hostage Taking Act, supra note 105.
176. See 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1)(A) (providing an exception to the position that §
1203 offenses do not apply extraterritorially against a person seized or detained who is
a national of the United States); Hostage Convention, supra note 30, at art. 5(1)(d)
(stating that jurisdiction may be established "if that state considers it appropriate").
177. See The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10, at 70 (Judg-
ment of Jan. 4, 1927) (holding that Turkey had jurisdiction over a French national on
a French ship that collided with a Turkish ship on the high seas). The court was reluc-
tant to rule on the passive personality principle, and instead based its holding on the
territorial principle. Id. at 74, 79. RESTATEMENT, supra note 142, at § 40 (listing cer-
tain factors modifying the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction when two states have
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existence of concurrent jurisdiction creates the potential for conflict be-
tween states, especially if one state does not accept the validity of the
second state's jurisdictional claim.1 78 The assertion of the passive per-
sonality principle may offend certain states especially if those states
seek to exercize an alternative, internationally recognized basis of juris-
diction. If the terrorist is within the territory of a sovereign state, the
sovereign could easily construe the use of the principle as a violation of
that sovereign state's rights. 179
In the Achille Lauro incident,180 the passive personality principle was
concurrent jurisdiction); Note, U.S. Legislation, supra note 110, at 933 (discussing the
difficulty of determining which state has the greater jurisdictional claim when states
assert concurrent jurisdiction).
178. See Note, U.S. Legislation, supra note 110, at 933-36 (describing the poten-
tial conflict when states assert concurrent jurisdiction). In the Achille Lauro incident,
the Italian government recognized the passive personality principle but was not willing
to forfeit its jurisdictional right to prosecute the terrorists. McGinley, supra note 34, at
693. When two states have concurrent jurisdiction, the state with the overriding inter-
est has the right to prosecute, unless there is a treaty obligation that defines the states'
respective responsibilities. Id. Where two or more states are legally present at the loca-
tion of the criminals and each state wishes to prosecute, it basically creates a "free-for-
all" situation in relation to capturing the criminals. Note, U.S. Legislation, supra note
110, at 958.
179. Blakesley, supra note 126, at 1109, 1114-17 (discussing the potential violation
of sovereign territory when one state exercises police powers within another state's na-
tional boundaries).
180. McGinley, supra note 34, at 691-94 (reporting the details of the Achille
Lauro incident). On October 7, 1985, members of a splinter group of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) seized the Italian ship, the Achille Lauro, while the
ship was in Egyptian waters near Port Said. N.Y. Times Oct. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
The terrorists separated and threatened to kill the American and Jewish passengers
from the group of tourists on the cruise ship docked at Cairo. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9,
1985, at Al, col. 6. Leon Klinghoffer, an elderly, crippled, Jewish-American citizen
was taken to the deck of the ship, shot in the head, and thrown overboard in his wheel-
chair. Id. In an effort to end the crisis, the Egyptian government negotiated with the
terrorists, who were given an Egyptian airplane to leave Egypt. The United States,
through intelligence sources, located the plane and forced it down at an air-base in
Signoella, Italy. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 6. Both American and Italian
troops were on the scene, prepared to receive the terrorists. Note, Achille Lauro Affair,
supra note 163, at 337. After a dispute between Italy and the United States over which
state should exercise criminal jurisdiction, the Italian government took the terrorists
into custody. Id. Italy later allowed a leader of the Palestinians suspected of involve-
ment in the hijacking to leave the country and seek asylum in Yugoslavia. The Italian
government charged the remaining four terrorists with piracy. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13,
1985, at Al, col. 6. The United States filed an extradition request under the Treaty on
Extradition between the United States and Italy requesting the extradition of all of the
accused terrorists for the crime of hostage-taking. United States of America and the
Republic of Italy, Oct. 13, 1983, United States-Italy, 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No.
8468, entered into force Jan. 21, 1977; see Documents Concerning the Achille Lauro
Affair and Cooperation in Combatting International Terrorism, 24 I.L.M. 1509-85
(1985) (providing the extradition requests and diplomatic letters sent by the United
States in an attempt to have all perpetrators extradited). According to article 6 of the
Hostage Convention and the Hostage Taking Act, if the American forces had taken
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the only basis of jurisdiction available to the United States.' The of-
fense occurred on an Italian ship in Egyptian waters.'82 The Italians
had jurisdiction under the floating territorial principle'83 and the Egyp-
tians had both territorial and personal jurisdiction over the offenders.'"
The only jurisdictional claim available to the United States arose under
the Hostage Convention when the terrorists took eighteen United
States citizens hostage and murdered Leon Klinghoffer.'80 To exercise
passive personality jurisdiction would have violated Italy's concurrent
and, in this case, overriding jurisdictional claim to the terrorists. The
presence of United States forces at the air-base in Sigonella, however,
indicates that the United States was prepared to take custody of the
accused terrorists if the Italians did not act immediately. 8"
custody of the accused terrorists, they would have jurisdiction to prosecute; see also
N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al1l, col. 5 (discussing barriers to extradition for murder
that limit the ability of American courts to prosecute the lesser crime of hostage-
taking).
181. See McGinley, supra note 34, at 710 (stating that the United States has juris-
diction "with respect to a hostage that is a national of that State," according to article
5(l)(d) of the Hostage Convention). Because both the United States and Egypt had
jurisdiction over the Achille Lauro terrorists under the Hostage Convention, either
state could prosecute for the ship's hijacking, but only Egypt could prosecute for mur-
der. Note, Achille Lauro Affair, supra note 163, at 346.
182. Note, Achille Lauro Affair, supra note 163, at 334. Although the United
States does not recognize the passive personality principle, the Hostage Convention
authorizes states to assert jurisdiction based on the nationality of the hostage. Hostage
Convention, supra note 30, at art. 5(1)(d).
183. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing the floating territorial
principle). But cf. Sofaer, Terrorism and Law, supra note 2, at 902 (discussing the
jurisdiction problems in the Achille Lauro case). The Achille Lauro case also presented
a question as to whether the terrorist acts constituted piracy. Id. at 910. The political
motives of the terrorists prevented the classification of pirates in this incident. Id. at
911. Consequently, United States law enforcement officials' desire to prosecute the
Achille Lauro terrorists faced jurisdictional difficulties. See also US. Jurisdiction Lim-
ited, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al 1, col. 5 (noting that United States courts did
not even have domestic legislation which would enable the courts to try the Achille
Lauro criminals for murder, but only for hostage-taking).
In the aftermath of the Achille Lauro incident, the Senate proposed and passed leg-
islation that would allow the United States to prosecute terrorist murder and impose
the death penalty on convicted terrorists. See Prosecution Bills, supra note 19 (discuss-
ing proposals to prosecute terrorists for attacks against United States citizens abroad,
particularly S. 1508, the Terrorist Death Penalty Act of 1985).
184. See Note, Achille Lauro Affair, supra note 163, at 344 (noting that Egypt
had jurisdiction over the terrorists but failed to prosecute them because of Egypt's
national interests). As a leader of the Arab world, to prosecute the terrorists would
have conflicted with Egypt's state interests. Id. at 345 n.94.
185. Id. at 345.
186. Note, U.S. Legislation, supra note 110, at 958.
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C. THE UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE
The universal principle could provide a more acceptable basis of ju-
risdiction over terrorists who take hostages.187 Traditionally, the univer-
sal principle is reserved for certain crimes that states deem so heinous
that any state able to obtain custody of the violator may prosecute the
violator.18 8 The universal principle provides jurisdiction to enforce sanc-
tions for crimes that have an independent basis in international law.
Examples of crimes that are currently considered of universal signifi-
cance are piracy,189 war crimes,co genocide,91 and the hijacking of
aircraft. 92
The United States has successfully prosecuted individuals under this
principle for violations of international law. 93 The use of the universal
187. See Paust, supra note 22, at 205 (Annexes A and B) (suggesting two legisla-
tive alternatives to solve the problem of obtaining jurisdiction over terrorists). The first
draft bases jurisdiction on the universal principle and calls for sanctions for the viola-
tion of human rights. Id. The second draft calls for the enactment of a federal statute
which would impose sanctions for the crime of "international terrorism" and defines
terrorism as "any intentional use of violence or threat of violence by the accused
against an instrumental target in order to communicate to a primary target a threat of
future violence so as to coerce the primary target through intense fear or anxiety in
connection with a demanded political outcome." Id. This second suggestion may be
more difficult to implement because, although it contains a useful definition of terror-
ism, it would inevitably be interpreted by some states as infringing upon the rights of
self-determination. See also Blakesley, supra note 126, at 1141 n.81 (1982) (sug-
gesting that terrorism is a crime of universal, or nearly universal, interest).
188. Blakesley, supra note 126, at 111.
189. See 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, arts. 14-22,
13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (outlawing international piracy).
190. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 821 (1983) (granting military courts jurisdiction over
any person subject to trial by military tribunal under the law of war); Attorney Gen-
eral of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Sup. Ct. Israel 1962) (holding that Israel
may rely on universal jurisdiction to prosecute Adolf Eichmann for Nazi war crimes).
191. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, G.A. Res. 260, U.N. Doec A/181, at 174 (1948), 78
U.N.T.S. 277. The United States Senate ratified this Convention in August 1986.
192. See supra note 127 (listing international treaties on the various crimes associ-
ated with aircraft hijacking).
193. See, e.g., Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-36 (1942) (prosecuting German
war criminals for war offenses, punishable under law of nations); United States v.
Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 479 (1887) (upholding constitutional power of Congress to pro-
vide for punishment of counterfeiting foreign bank notes as offense against law of na-
tions); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 153 (1820) (upholding consti-
tutional power of Congress to prosecute piracy under law of nations); Talbot v. Jansen,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159-61 (1795) (Iredell, J., concurring) (granting jurisdiction over
a French privateer to determine the legitimacy of his ship's activities on the high seas);
United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297, 298-99 (1793) (granting concurrentjurisdiction over an alien sending letters threatening extortion to Pennsylvania citizen);
Respublica v. DeLongchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 116-17 (1784) (upholding the use
of the universal principle of jursidiction to prosecute a person threatening and assault-
ing French diplomats in United States); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212,
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principle to prosecute terrorists who takes hostages may succeed if
states categorize terrorist offenses as heinous and internationally con-
demnable, allowing any state with custody to prosecute. 10' Classifying
the offense of hostage-taking under this theory is the most effective
means of asserting jurisdiction over those who victimize innocent
civilians. 9
Applying the universal principle to terrorists who attack and murder
will not resolve the problem of concurrent jurisdiction when more than
one state claims the right to prosecute the offenders. Until an interna-
tional consensus exists on the validity of applying universal jurisdiction
for hostage-taking and certain terrorist acts, justified by the heinous
nature of the crimes, the potential conflict caused by states excercising
concurrent jurisdiction will not subside. Effective measures to combat
terrorism in the international community will require both consensus
and international sanctions ensuring prosecution. An effort to achieve
this goal is illustrated by the United Nations Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages.
216-21 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (applying the passive personality principle according to the
United Nations Convention on the Protection and Punishment of Crimes Against Inter-
nationally Protected Persons where extraterritorial acts resulted in the death of Con-
gressman Ryan); United States v. White, 27 F. Cas. 200, 201-03 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1886)
(granting jurisdiction for acts of piracy); United States v. Baker, 24 F. Cas. 962, 965(C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1861) (No. 14501) (upholding jurisdiction over acts of piracy); United
States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 653 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813) (No. 15494) (upholding jurisdiction
over acts of piracy); Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1107-08 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No.
6360) (finding that the federal judiciary has jurisdiction over offense against the law of
nations and upholding conviction of citizens of neutral state who participated in attack
by one belligerent power upon another); see also RESTATEIENT DRAFr, supra note 14,
at § 404 (discussing the possible use of the universal principle to obtain jurisdiction
over terrorists).
194. Blakesley, supra note 126, at I111.
195. RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 14, at § 404 comment a (noting that al-
though terrorism is internationally condemned, problems with defining terrorism have
prevented any internationally effective agreements from sanctioning the crime). If hos-
tage-taking is incorporated as one of the offenses under universal jurisdiction, the focus
would shift from the definition of terrorism as a whole to the single act of hostage-
taking. The United States is already a member of one treaty that categorizes certain
aspects of terrorism as crimes with universal dimensions. OAS Terrorism Convention,
supra note 128, at art. II (adopting the universal principle of jurisdiction for certain
acts of terrorism, regardless of motive).
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V. AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO TERRORISM
A. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST THE TAKING OF
HOSTAGES
1. A Historical Perspective
In past years, the League of Nations and the United Nations at-
tempted but failed to address the problem of terrorism generally.0' For
example, the United States proposed a Draft Convention on Terror-
ism1 97 to the United Nations in 1972, but the United Nations rejected
the proposal because of its broad provisions creating jurisdiction over
anyone who attempts to kill, or actually kills, causes serious bodily
harm, or kidnaps another person."9 8 The proposed Convention on Ter-
rorism would have given broad classes of terrorist crimes international
significance and classified them as crimes of universal interest.19
This broad proposal to outlaw terror-violence failed to solve the pri-
mary problem of distinguishing between self-determination, a "legiti-
mate" form of resistance or struggle, and terrorism, an unacceptable
form of seeking radical change. Because of their divergent political and
ideological interests, states are unwilling to compromise on a definition
of terrorism that would restrict their ability to promote, and in some
cases defend, their interests.200
196. See generally Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism,
34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 37) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/34/37 (1979) (discussing the per-
spectives of nations on the use of the political offense exception by hostage-takers);
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 37) at 4,
U.N. Doc. A/32/37 (1977) (discussing the problems preventing the participating na-
tions from reaching a consensus on the crime of hostage-taking); 28 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 28) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973) (noting the need for an international
consensus on the components of terrorism); Convention for the Prevention and Punish-
ment of Terrorism, Nov. 16, 1937, 19 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., PART I, at 21 (sug-
gesting the general sanctioning of the crime of terrorism); see also C. DOBSON & R.
PAYNE, COUNTERATTACK: THE WEST'S BATTLE AGAINST THE TERRORISTS 3 (1982)
(stating that the Council of the League of Nations found the rules of international law
insufficient to address international terrorism).
197. Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of Inter-
national Terrorism: United States Working Paper, art. I, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.850
(Agenda Item 92) (Sept. 25, 1972) [hereinafter Draft Convention], reprinted in 1 R.
FRIEDLANDER, supra note 24, at 487 (1979).
198. Draft Convention, supra note 197, at art. I.
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (noting the inherent difficulties
of nations attempting to agree upon a single definition of terrorism). But cf infra notes
218-25 and accompanying text (describing the achievement of a compromise on the
definition of terrorism in the Hostage Convention).
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2. Lack of Consensus on an International Definition of Terrorism
Realizing that no broad definition could satisfy all states, the United
Nations addressed specific types of terrorist acts that, according to an
international consensus, are condemnable. 20 ' The United Nations de-
cided to consider hostage-taking in the same manner. The United Na-
tions approached the problem by attacking the most internationally
condemned terrorist activities. 0 2 Acting on limited, less controversial
subjects, United Nations conventions have generally succeeded in
preventing aircraft hijacking203 and protecting diplomats. 204
The United Nations Security Council recently adopted a resolution
indicating that the United Nations is ready to declare the taking of
hostages a heinous offense under any circumstances. 20 5 The United Na-
tions General Assembly also adopted a resolution calling for measures
to prevent international terrorism and acts of violence that sacrifice in-
nocent lives in attempts to affect radical changes.200 The willingness of
the United Nations to impose sanctions or take measures against hos-
tage-takers will determine the actual deterrent strength of recent decla-
rations against hostage-taking.
The Hostage Convention represents a strong international consensus
that hostage-taking is an unacceptable method of terror-violence. The
United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism (Ad
Hoc Committee) drafted the Hostage Convention and presented the fi-
201. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text (listing crimes that the inter-
national community sanctions as violations of the law of nations).
202. See Nanda, Progress Report on the United Nations' Attempt To Draft "An
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages," 6 Otto N.U.L. REv. 89,
89 (1979) [hereinafter Nanda] (discussing the shift from a comprehensive to a piece-
meal approach to restraining terrorism); see also Verwey, The International Hostage
Convention and National Liberation Movements, 75 AM. J. INV'L L. 69, 69 (1981)
[hereinafter Verwey] (quoting the United States interpretation of article 12 of the Hos-
tage Convention). Article 12 creates an exception to the Hostage Convention extradi-
tion clause if the offender's position would be substantially prejudiced by extradition to
a certain state. Hostage Convention, supra note 30, art. 12. The United States inter-
preted this article as creating a limited protection from extradition to a certain state,
not as a general exception from the obligation to prosecute or extradite. Verwey, supra,
at 111. The question of national liberation movements and their rights under the Hos-
tage Convention was one of the major controversies the Ad Hoc Committee faced. Id.
203. See supra note 127 (listing conventions adopted to curtail aircraft hijacking).
204. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing the success of the in-
ternational community in protecting diplomats).
205. 40 U.N. SCOR (2637th mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/579 (1985) (labelling
the taking of hostages as offenses "of grave concern to the international community,
having severe adverse consequences for the rights of the victims" and for the relations
among states).
206. See supra note 10 (discussing the General Assembly's resolution to prevent
and eliminate acts of international terrorism).
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nal document for signature in December 1979.207 The Convention fol-
lows the format and spirit of the Protection of Diplomats Conven-
tion,208 which is highly regarded as an effective deterrent to terrorist
acts against diplomats and internationally protected persons.209
The primary principle underlying the Hostage Convention dictates
that those who take, or attempt to take hostages are subject to prosecu-
tion or extradition by any signatory state if apprehended within that
state's jurisdiction. 210 The signatory states also have a duty to under-
take preventive measures to combat terrorist activity within their bor-
ders.211 In drafting the Hostage Convention, the Ad Hoc Committee
sought to exclude any provisions with ambiguous interpretations. The
fact that signatory states follow different domestic laws, however, re-
sulted in various expectations among different states. Even the Hostage
Convention's guarantee of prosecution or extradition will not always
adequately satisfy an injured state's expectations concerning proper
punishment.212
207. Rosenstock, supra note 126, at 169. The signatory states to the Hostage Con-
vention include: The Bahamas, Barbados, Bhutan, Canada, Chile, Egypt, El Salvador,
Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Kenya, Korea,
Lesotho, Mauritius, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Su-
rinam, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad & Tobago, United Kingdom, United States, and
Yugoslavia. U.S. STATE DEP'T, A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1986. Twenty-eight
states have ratified the Hostage Convention, including the United States which ratified
on December 7, 1984. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General:
Status as of 31 December 1985, at XVIII-5, U.N. Doc. St/Leg/Ser. E/4, U.N. Sales
No. E.86.U.3 (1986).
208. Convention on Protected Persons, supra note 128.
209. Rosenstock, supra note 126, at 172 (noting the success of the Protection of
Diplomats Convention in arresting the numerous attacks against diplomatic personnel);
see also Convention on Protected Persons, supra note 128 (making attacks against dip-
lomatic personnel a crime of universal significance).
210. Rosenstock, supra note 126, at 169. The obligation of a party to the Hostage
Convention is to extradite or prosecute a suspected terrorist to a competent authority.
Hostage Convention, supra note 30, at art. 6, 8. Therefore, there is assurance of the
prosecution of the suspected terrorist, preventing the terrorist from seeking asylum or
"safe haven" under the political offense exception. If, for the purpose of extradition,
the suspect falls under the "substantial probability of prejudice" exception to article
12, the state's obligation is to either prosecute or extradite the suspect to another coun-
try that can prosecute. Hostage Convention art. 10. Although this provision was
designed to destroy any loopholes, situations still exist in which a criminal could escape
prosecution under this article. For example, if a state with personal jurisdiction has not
enacted national laws that impose sanctions for the particular crime committed and
another state requesting extradition has the jurisdictional grounds to prosecute, but
meets the "substantial prejudice" test, then neither state may prosecute and the ac-
cused criminal may go free.
211. Rosenstock, supra note 126, at 170 (discussing measures that states are re-
quired to take to prevent terrorist activity within national borders).
212. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text (describing the Achille Lauro
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Two controversial issues posing problems during the drafting of the
Hostage Convention were the definition of terrorism and the situations
involving asylum under the political offense exception to extradition.
Defining terrorism will remain a problem as long as the perpetrators of
terrorism continue to legitimize their activity as self-determination.21 3
National liberation movements and Eastern European countries ex-
pressed particular concern with the distinction between terrorist activ-
ity and legitimate liberation struggles because of the distinction's po-
tential to undermine their activities. 214
These nations did not want the Hostage Convention to define terror-
ism in a way that would undermine struggles of national liberation
movements and make their activities unacceptable under international
law.21 5 Without specific language regarding the legitimacy of self-de-
termination, these nations feared that more powerful states would use
the Hostage Convention to deny their right of self-determination be-
cause of the low-level warfare characteristics of such struggles.21
Western delegations fought against the inclusion of allowances for self-
determination struggles, arguing that the distinction would create ex-
incident). Yugoslavia afforded the alleged masterminds of the plot refuge and refused
the extradition requests of the United States on the ground that the persons were not
the actual perpetrators of the crime. Terrorists Seize Cruise Ship in Mediterranean, 85
DEP'T ST. BULL. 74, 74-81 (Oct. 1985). The United States unsuccessfully asserted the
agency theory to have the alleged planners extradited regardless of the United States
extradition treaty with Yugoslavia and Yugoslavia's membership to the Hostage Con-
vention. Id.
213. See Paust, A Survey of the Possible Legal Responses to Terrorism: Preven-
tion, Punishment, & Cooperative Action, 5 GA. J. INT'L & Cot.P. L. 431, 437-41(1975) (discussing various justifications for violent actions committed by terrorists and
insurgents).
214. Verwey, supra note 202, at 72; see also Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Terrorism, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39), U.N. Doc. A/32/39 at 28, 32, 34-36, 56,
and 76 (1977) (reflecting various countries' concerns that the Convention distinguish
liberation movements' activities from acts perpetrated by criminals under ordinary
law).
215. Verwey, supra note 202, at 72.
216. Cf Rosenstock, supra note 126, at 175-76 (addressing four rationales for in-
cluding language on equal rights and self-determination in the preamble to the Hostage
Convention). The rationales are: 1) to prevent the abuse of the Convention by states
seeking to repress rather than protect human rights; 2) to satisfy Third World desire to
reiterate the legitimacy of self-determination; 3) to support the legitimacy of the use of
force in struggles of self-determination; and 4) to foreshadow the operative portions of
the Convention. Id. There is an increasing trend to classify violent terrorist activity as
warfare where supporting states can be identified. See Kaddafi's Crusade, NEWSWEEK,
Apr. 7, 1986, at 20 (describing the United States attack on Libya after numerous
provocations announced by Kaddafi and detected by intelligence); A New Kind of War,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7, 1986, at 16 (discussing President Reagan's "Rambo diplomacy"
and justifications by his administration).
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ceptions to the prohibition against hostage-taking.21
Disagreeing nations compromised, establishing article 12 of the Hos-
tage Convention. 218 The compromise excluded acts committed during
armed conflicts (including struggles of self-determination) that were
covered under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Pro-
tocols from consideration under the Hostage Convention.21 Some na-
tions interpreted article 12 as a protective clause, ensuring that the
Hostage Convention would not be used against national liberation
movements who took hostages "in the course of struggle" against op-
pressive regimes. 22 0 This interpretation caused a considerable amount
of controversy. Certain states felt that article 12 gave national libera-
tion movements a license to take hostages, excluding them from cover-
age when engaged in "armed conflict. ' 22 1 Nonaligned countries222 re-
sponded that article 12 did not give national liberation movements full
license to commit terrorist acts, 223 rather it prevented the use of the
Convention against national liberation movements taking hostages in
the course of a legitimate struggle.224
Satisfied with the passage of article 12, the supporters of a separate
clause for self-determination no longer feared that the Convention
would bar their struggles. The Western delegations were also satisfied
concluding that the Convention did not give nations a limitless right to
active self-determination.2 25 Those favoring the inclusion of an excep-
tion for national liberation movements in the Hostage Convention in-
terpreted article 12 as a guarantee that the Hostage Convention would
not be used against self-determination struggles.226 The drafters of the
Convention, however, viewed article 12 as a mere reassurance of the
217. Rosenstock, supra note 126, at 73.
218. Id. at 87-88 (discussing proposals offered by aligned and nonaligned countries
to balance the interests of states concerned with the inclusion of exceptional rights for
national liberation movements).
219. Hostage Convention, supra note 30, at art. 12.
220. Verwey, supra note 202, at 85-89 (discussing the compromises and negotia-
tions in drafting article 12).
221. Rosenstock, supra note 126 , at 184.
222. Verwey, supra note 202, at 77.
223. Id. at 77.
224. Id. at 72-73.
225. Rosenstock, supra note 126, at 183-85. Many developing, Eastern European,
and some African countries feared that article 12 would be used to outlaw their legiti-
mate struggles for self-determination. Id. Western countries feared that terrorists and
perpetrators of violent insurgency would use article 12 to escape obligatory extradition
and prosecution under the Hostage Convention. Id.
226. See Verwey, supra note 202, at 86 (emphasizing that the inclusion of lan-
guage on self-determination was interpreted not as an exception for these groups, but
as a distinction between their activities and the activities of ordinary criminals, includ-
ing terrorists).
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legitimacy of national liberation struggles in international law, not as
an exception from prosecution.227 Such an exception, if allowed, would
significantly undermine the Hostage Convention's scope, limiting a na-
tion's ability to prosecute "whosoever" takes hostages.2 28
3. The Political Offense Exception to Extradition: A Scapegoat for
Terrorists
Distinguishing terrorist movements from national liberation move-
ments creates an exception to the Convention's hostage-taking provi-
sions, establishing circumstances that legitimize hostage-taking. 2 In
addition, a dispute exists concerning when national liberation move-
ments are considered in "armed conflict" and accordingly protected by
the Geneva Convention.230 The resistance of national liberation strug-
gles is not classified as traditional "armed conflict," but low-level war-
fare characterized by sudden attacks and sabotage, with the key ele-
ment being surprise. To allow national liberation movements to
legitimize hostage-taking, claiming that they are in "armed conflict,"
permits liberation movements to escape the Hostage Convention's
scope. Therefore, to ensure the Convention's effectiveness, the Conven-
tion should prohibit all hostage-taking.231
Western delegations supported the prohibition of hostage-taking
without exception.232 As a compromise, the Ad Hoc Committee in-
cluded a list of conventions not affected by the Hostage Convention and
adopted additional language stating that the Convention did not bar
principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter.233 The Committee
included this language to avoid complications in determining which
convention would govern in an "armed conflict." 23' The national libera-
227. Cf. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Interna-
tional Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 420 (1980) [hereinafter Nash] (expressing that article
12(1) does not create an exception to the Convention unless the activities involved are
already covered under the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols and that
states are obligated under those conventions to prosecute or extradite the terrorists).
228. Id. at 420-21.
229. See Hostage Convention, supra note 30, at art. 12 (providing distinction be-
tween terrorism and struggles of national liberation).
230. See infra note 251 (listing the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols).
231. Nash, supra note 227, at 420 (discussing the United States denial that the
Hostage Convention creates any exception for national liberation movements or anyone
else).
232. Id.
233. Hostage Convention, supra note 30, at art. 12.
234. McDonald, The United Nations Convention against the Taking of Hostages:
The Inside Story, 6 TERRORISM: AN INT'L J. 545, 552 (1983) (discussing the United
States proposal to clarify the question of what international legal instrument would
govern during periods of armed conflict between states); see also Friedlander, Corn-
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tion movements insisted on this inclusion because the Geneva Conven-
tions and Additional Protocols recognize self-determination movements
as involved in legitimate struggles.2"5
National liberation movements and developing countries feared that
the Hostage Convention would deny the legitimacy of their struggles
with oppressive regimes, defining their low-level warfare methods as
prohibited terrorist activity. 236 The Hostage Convention's goal is not to
deny the legitimacy of certain struggles, but to legitimize a viable tool
against the victimization of innocent citizens and to assure that those
who practice this form of terrorism do not escape prosecution. 3 7 The
drafters sought to establish that there is no "safe haven" for anyone
who takes hostages and that signatory states have an obligation to as-
sert jurisdiction, if the opportunity arises.238
The controversy surrounding the extradition requirement posed an-
other problem for the Ad Hoc Committee. Articles 8 and 9, which are
central to the Convention's implementation, mandate that governments
either extradite persons who take hostages, or submit their case to a
competent authority for prosecution "without exception whatsoever. '2 39
The operational phrase "without exception whatsoever" requires signa-
tory states to act even if the crimes are not committed within their
territories. Articles 8 and 9 guarantee the prosecution of terrorists who
take hostages, regardless of extradition or other treaty obligations, be-
cause signatory states must assert jurisdiction upon a suspected of-
fender's apprehension. 24 0 Accordingly, the provision is the Convention's
crucial enforcement mechanism. Without articles 8 and 9, a state
claiming that no treaty exists could deny extradition. Additionally,
ment: Unmuzzling the Dogs of War, 7 TERRORISM: AN INT'L J. 169, 169 (1984) (dis-
cussing the confusion about the point at which political terrorists become legitimate
freedom fighters).
235. See Rosenstock, supra note 126, at 183-85 (discussing the difficult negotia-
tions between nations supporting an absolute prohibition of all hostage-taking and na-
tions fearing the potential repressive powers of an all-inclusive prohibition on hostage-
taking upon states in struggles of self-determination); see also Yoder, The Effective-
ness of United Nations Action against International Terrorism: Conclusions and Com-
ments, 6 TERRORISM: AN INT'L J. 587 (1983) (noting that the fear that a broad Con-
vention may be used to suppress national liberation movements prevents the United
Nations from concluding a terrorism convention that absolutely prevents terrorist
activity).
236. See Verwey, supra note 202, at 71 (discussing the demands of developing
countries to distinguish self-determination from terrorist warfare).
237. Id. at 83.
238. Hostage Convention, supra note 30, at art. 8.
239. Id. at arts. 8, 9.
240. See Hostage Convention, supra note 30, at art. 8 (requiring prosecution or
extradition) and art. 9 (providing protection for offenders where extradition to a certain
state may result in prejudicial treatment or insufficient due process).
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without these articles, a state claiming insufficient jurisdictional
grounds under international laws could refuse to prosecute terrorists.
Article 8 confirms that signatory states are under an affirmative obliga-
tion to prosecute or extradite all apprehended terrorists. "
Article 9 describes states' obligations to extradite terrorists who take
hostages when the state with personal jurisdiction cannot prosecute the
offender. 42 Article 9 also provides limited exceptions to the extradition
requirements,243 denying extradition when there is suspicion that the
state seeking extradition has an ulterior motive for prosecuting the of-
fenders.24 4 The extradition requirements serve two specific objectives.
First, obligations of signatory states under all extradition treaties are
modified to the extent that they are inconsistent with the Hostage Con-
vention.24 5 This provision guarantees that when a state does not wish to
prosecute, or has any contrary obligations with respect to extradition,
the state has one of two options-extradition or prosecution.248 Second,
the extradition requirements protect individuals against persecution
when a state believes that extradition is sought for the purpose of pros-
ecuting or punishing a person on account of race, religion, nationality,
ethnic origin, or political opinion. 247 The political exception to the ex-
tradition causes two problems. In some cases, foreign states will not
agree with the United States on the "political status" of the offend-
ers.248 In these cases, offenders can seek political asylum and therefore
escape the jurisdiction of nations seeking extradition.
The nature of most international terrorist attacks is political,
whether the terrorists seek ransom, the release of prisoners, or just the
public humiliation of a foreign government .2 0 The controversial dis-
241. Id. at art. 8 (providing that without exception whatsoever, states must prose-
cute or extradite).
242. Id. at art. 9.
243. Id. at art. 9, para. 1.
244. Id.
245. Id. at art. 9, para. 2; see also Verwey, supra note 202, at 92 (discussing com-
promises achieved in negotiating article 9).
246. Hostage Convention, supra note 30, at art. 9.
247. See id. at art. 9, para. l(a) (providing states with the option of extraditing or
prosecuting); see also Rosenstock, supra note 126, at 182 (discussing the rationale for
including the option to extradite or prosecute). If a state refuses to extradite, it must
nonetheless submit the case to a competent authority for adjudication. Id. at 183. The
"substantial belief" standard will allow states to prove their good faith in requesting
extradition by assuring recognized types of protection (including security methods to
protect the accused from harm and visits from the Red Cross). Id.
248. See Nanda, supra note 202, at 100-03 (discussing the fear of the Ad Hoc
Committee that lack of agreement on the acceptable limits of the political offense ex-
ception would undermine the scope of the Hostage Convention).
249. This World, supra note 130, at 31, 32.
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tinction between legitimate and illegitimate political struggles for the
purpose of prosecuting violent terrorist acts has hindered the develop-
ment of an international consensus on the most effective sanctions for
eliminating the threat of international terror.2 50 By outlawing the tak-
ing of hostages for any purpose not covered by the Geneva Conventions
and the Additional Protocols, 5 the Ad Hoc Committee sought to elim-
inate the use of the political exception in circumstances involving the
taking of hostages by violent international terrorists. Although states
with custody of terrorists are obligated to either prosecute or extradite,
the evidentiary laws and sanctions are often considerably less stringent
than comparable laws in the United States. 52
4. The Optional Clause: Adoption of the Passive Personality
Principle
The Hostage Convention contains an optional clause that grants ju-
risdiction on the basis of the passive personality principle.25 3 For exam-
ple, the Convention specifically grants jurisdiction for crimes commit-
ted against American citizens on the basis of their nationality.2 4
250. Friedlander, Commentary-Definitional Factors, in 3 R. FRIEDLANDER, TER-
RORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL-FROM THE TERROR
DECADE OF THE 1970'S TO THE DANGEROUS DECADE OF THE 1980's 5-6 (1981).
Problems surrounding the issue of self-determination resulted from the insistence of
some states on the inclusion of language distinguishing terrorist hostage-taking from
legitimate actions of struggle for self-determination. Verwey, supra note 202, at 72.
251. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of
Armed Forces in the Field (Convention I), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No.
3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked of Armed Forces at Sea (Convention II), Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War (Convention III), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 5 U.N.T.S. 287; and Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War (Convention IV), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S.
No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Two protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions were
adopted on August 12, 1949, Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), reprinted in Official Documents:
Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanita-
rian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 457, 502 (1978).
252. See generally Sofaer, The Political Offense Exception and Terrorism, 85
DEP'T ST. BULL. 58 (Dec. 1985) (discussing the interplay of the political offense excep-
tion and the inability to bring criminals to justice). Additional problems are raised
when varying domestic laws of signatory states allow terrorists to escape prosecution.
Verwey, supra note 202, at 87-88 (stating that if a signatory state with custody of a
suspected terrorist does not have the appropriate domestic legislation to prosecute, and
the accused is not extraditable for political reasons, the accused may either escape
jurisdiction or face prosecution for a less severe crime).
253. Hostage Convention, supra note 30, at art. 5(1)(d).
254. Id. The provision includes an optional clause for states unwilling to recognize
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Originally, the United States objected to the inclusion of this provision
in the Convention, claiming that the passive personality principle is
reasonable for diplomatic personnel255 but should not extend to ordi-
nary citizens. United States representatives asserted that the protection
of the passive personality principle should not extend beyond diplomats
and internationally protected persons. 256 Civil law states insisted that
the Convention include the passive personality principle. This insistence
resulted in a compromise, granting jurisdiction on the basis of national-
ity when state finds it appropriate.257 The extraterritorial jurisdiction
extension represents a departure in United States foreign policy.
United States domestic legislation, granting jurisdiction on the basis of
the victim's nationality, has expanded the application of the passive
personality principle to obtain jurisdiction over terrorists who take
hostages.
The willingness of Congress to include the passive personality princi-
ple of jurisdiction indicates the increasing acceptability of the princi-
ple's application to international terrorist attacks on civilians because
of their nationality. This departure from the traditionally applied juris-
dictional theories of international law is consistent with the Hostage
Convention, but inconsistent with the jurisdictional principles of the
majority of states.
The Hostage Convention could prove as effective as the complemen-
tary conventions 258 in addressing international terrorism.250 Terrorists
will inevitably succeed in a number of efforts to infiltrate security sys-
tems and state protective measures. Instances when perpetrators escape
to "freedom" states that offer them sanctuary may render the broad
provisions of the Hostage Convention useless, especially in geographic
areas of common terrorist violence and little political control.
CONCLUSION
As technology advances, the defensive race against terrorism be-
this principle as a valid basis of international jurisdiction. Id.
255. Rosenstock, supra note 126, at 180; see supra note 128 (listing Conventions
providing for protection of diplomatic personnel).
256. Rosenstock, supra note 126, at 180. During the negotiations on the Hostage
Convention, the United States objected to the use of the passive personality principle as
a basis for jurisdiction over terrorists. Id.
257. Id.
258. See supra notes 85, 86, 108, 127, and 128 (citing international conventions
against various forms of terrorism).
259. See Nanda, supra note 202, at 108 (noting that the Hostage Convention,
modeled after the successful aircraft hijacking conventions and Diplomats Convention,
is a necessary and desirable step forward in combatting international terrorism).
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comes more difficult-especially when states with substantial resources
and access to technology support terrorist activity. Divergent interests
and ideologies handicap the international community's struggle to
reach a consensus on the legitimacy of certain aspects of terrorism. At-
tacking the manifestations of terrorism systematically through multilat-
eral conventions may pose the best method of reaching a consensus on
the nature of the problems. This is a slow process, however, that does
not offer much promise to terrorist victims. To halt the taking and kill-
ing of innocent citizens, the United Nations should find that this crime
is of universal dimension, and allow any state apprehending terrorists
to prosecute or extradite. Declaring hostage-taking a crime of universal
significance would essentially condemn all acts of hostage-taking in the
interest of mankind. Such a determination would equate jurisdiction
over hostage-taking crimes with hijacking. Proclaiming hostage-taking
a universal crime would eliminate problems inherent in the assertion of
the passive personality principle, expanding a nation's jurisdictional
reach and increasing the potential for prosecution or extradition.
Absent the adoption of a universal designation for the crime of hos-
tage-taking, the United States demonstrated its willingness to assert
the passive personality principle of jurisdiction in the Achille Lauro in-
cident. No matter how strong the traditional repudiation of the passive
personality principle, the United States has accepted the theory for the
purpose of prosecuting terrorists who take American hostages, whether
they are diplomats or innocent persons. Adopting this questionable
principle of international jurisdiction may prove effective because it is
tailored to the nature of the crime-directed at innocent citizens purely
on the basis of their nationality.
Expressly adopting either the passive personality or the universal
principle to gain jurisdiction over international terrorists substantially
deviates from the traditional approach to the terrorist problem. The
United States has never employed the passive personality principle to
assert jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime2 0 and has not adopted the
260. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (noting that United States
courts recognize the existence of this principle, but generally reject its validity as an
acceptable independent basis of jurisdiction); see also Rivard v. United States, 375
F.2d 882, 885-86 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967) (acknowledging the
passive personality principle under the law of nations but granting jurisdiction under
the objective territorial principle over a heroin smuggler's acts having an effect within
sovereign state); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 215-16 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
(noting that Congress has the power to employ the passive personality principle under
the law of nations but declining to apply the passive personality principle where other
grounds of jurisdiction exist); United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 487 (S.D.
Cal. 1960), aff'd sub nom. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 546-47 (9th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961) (discussing United States jurisdiction over
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universal principle with respect to hostage-taking.6 1 One of the reasons
the United States hesitated to adopt either the universal or passive per-
sonality principle is the lack of international guidelines defining terror-
ism and outlining acceptable jurisdictional principles to address the
problem. The 1985 Restatement Draft suggests that the United States
may consider terrorism a crime of universal significance. 2 Asserting
jurisdiction under this theory is difficult, however, because there is no
international consensus on the definition of terrorism.2 0 3
Adoption of the universal principle does not guarantee prosecution or
extradition of offenders, but it increases the potential for states to as-
sert jurisdiction where no other basis of jurisdiction exists. Even univer-
sal jurisdiction is inadequate to ensure prosecution if states continue to
offer sanctuary and support to terrorists. Although the Reagan Admin-
istration has called on the international community for a "tougher"
policy on the apprehension and prosecution of terrorists,21' before rec-
aliens for crimes committed abroad and finding extraterritorial jurisdiction through in-
terpretation of congressional intent). But see RESTATEMENT DRAFr, supra note 14, at §
402 comment g (mentioning the passive personality principle as a potential means of
obtaining jurisdiction over terrorist who victimize citizens on the basis of their
nationality).
261. OAS Terrorism Convention, supra note 128 (adopting the universal principle
of jurisdiction for terrorist crimes). Article II states that:
[F]or the purposes of this convention, kidnapping, murder, and other assaults
against the life or personal integrity of those persons to whom the state has the
duty to give special protection according to international law, as well as extortion
in connection with those crimes, shall be considered common crimes of interna-
tional significance, regardless of motive.
Id.
262. RESTATEMENT DRAFr, supra note 14, at § 404 (stating that "a state may exer-
cise jurisdiction to define and punish certain offenses recognized by the community of
nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, . . . and perhaps terrorism").
263. See R. FRIEDLANDER, TERROR-VIOLENCE, supra note 27, 153 (citing the fail-
ure of the international community to define and offer effective sanctions against ter-
rorism as stifling any effective international deterrent of terror violence). Approaching
the problem broadly, Friedlander defines terrorism as an "attack upon the prevailing
legal order." Id. at 154; see also A. SCHMID, supra note 12, at 5-9 (1983) (analyzing
various definitions of terrorism and concluding that one must consider the framework
of the definition and the components of the crime).
Finding an internationally acceptable definition of terrorism is one of the major
stumbling blocks in United Nations attempts to enact conventions prohibiting the more
offensive aspects of terrorist activity. Because of the difficulties of reaching a consensus,
the United Nations has approached the problems of terrorism by singling out the activ-
ities that are the most offensive to nations. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying
text (discussing various definitions of international terrorism and the problem of the
lack of a universal definition). The international stagnation on defining terrorism frus-
trates the United States government in its quest of finding a solution to the problem of
hostage-taking and to barriers of prosecution.
264. Oakley, supra note 46, at 73 (reiterating the Reagan Administration's com-
mitment to the fight against international terrorism and calling for support for the
fiscal year 1986 security assistance program).
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ommending the sanctions for international terror-violence, the interna-
tional community will have to reach a consensus that designates which
activities and actors are condemnable. The inability to distinguish be-
tween terrorism and self-determination, terrorists and freedom-fighters,
has retarded the progress of the United Nations in issuing effective
measures to stop terror-violence. Once nations overcome the defini-
tional threshold, the universal principle could provide a broad base of
jurisdiction to ensure apprehension and prosecution of the offenders.
